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Throughout the most recent decade of the United States’ history, the government’s 
participation in what has been characterized as humanitarian military intervention in Iraq and 
Afghanistan has generally been one of the most contested and debated issues in the media and in 
political discourse1. Since 2003, the US Coalition’s involvement in Iraq has included the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the establishment of a new Iraqi administration, and 
military efforts against militias such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Mahdi Army.  While the US-led 
Coalition’s stated primary objectives following the invasion of Iraq included the reestablishment 
of stability and security following the change in administration, it has instead witnessed the 
collapse of the state and the fragmentation of the Iraqi political scene along ethnic and religious 
lines. In the absence of a stable, fair, and efficient government and military, foreign and domestic 
militia groups have gained an enormous amount of power and subjected Iraqi civilians to acts of 
violence based on their ethnic or religious identity, making it nearly impossible for them to 
rebuild their society after years of hardship and instability. 
 The primary issue of public debate about the actions of the United States in Iraq is most 
often whether or not the US was justified in its military intervention and the destruction of the 
Iraqi state. While this issue will featured in Chapter Three, it will not serve as the central focus of 
my research. Instead, I seek to evaluate the effects of the US-led Coalition’s activities in Iraq on 
the fragmentation of Iraqi society and the development of extremist militias that use violence 
against civilians in order to gain political power. Overall, this essay will investigate and analyze 
the concept of identity, how the state uses identity as a political tool, and how violence is used to 
enforce this vision of identity. 
                                               
1
 Kurth, James. "Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities."Orbis 50.1 (2006): 87-101. 
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To understand the origins and causes of communal violence as seen today in Iraq, I chose 
to take a historical approach. In particular, this thesis will focus on the role of the past and 
present governments in shaping different constructions of Iraqi national identity as a political 
tool. My research is divided into three main sections focusing on three of the most prominent 
governments in Iraq’s modern history; the British Mandate (1914-1932), Saddam Hussein’s 
Ba’ath Party dictatorship (1979-2003), and the American occupation (2003-present).  
 Several key concepts inform my research as they go to the core of the issues studied here. 
They will be explored and analyzed within the context of each regime and associated historical 
period include nationalism, political identity, communal identity, religion, ethnicity, colonialism, 
and neopatrimonialism. Essential questions to keep in mind while analyzing these themes within 
each historical period include; What was the role of the state in constructing a national identity?, 
What role did foreign influence or intervention play in the construction or enforcement of these 
identities?, When and how was violence introduced as a tool of the state for molding identity?, 
and How, why, and when did relations among civilians break down and develop into full-scale 
sectarian violence?. By using these key concepts to answer these questions, I seek to uncover and 
analyze the impact of the policies of successive administrations on the current ethnic/religious 
fragmentation of Iraqi politics and society. 
Chapter One will predominantly focus on the role of the state in constructing a national 
Iraqi identity during the British Mandate period from 1914-1932.2 Throughout the Middle East 
during this time, powerful European nation states were carving up the remnants of the ailing 
Ottoman Empire even before its official demise following World War I.  Vast stretches of land 
that were once under Ottoman jurisdiction were carved up into new nation states whose borders 
                                               
2
 Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004. p. 193 
Bellini 10
corresponded  with the economic and political interests of European imperialist powers.3 This 
disregard for the wishes of the existing indigenous population in favor of foreign interests would 
become a major roadblock to the construction of a strong, unified polity in Iraq and other former 
Ottoman protectorates such as Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. In Iraq, British officers attempted to 
construct an Iraqi identity that would inspire feelings of commonality and nationalism among the 
Iraqi people, but not one that would be strong enough to overpower the economic and political 
interests of the British Empire, which the new Iraqi administration was designed to favor.4 
Nationalism, colonialism and political identity are several prominent concepts and themes that 
will be focused on in this chapter. Questions that guide narrative in this chapter include, What 
were the dimensions of the Iraqi national identity being propagated by the British, and why were 
these chosen?, How did British perceptions and manipulation of different Iraqi communities 
impact the construction of the new Iraqi government?, and How did the British vision of Iraqi 
nationalism differ from that of King Faisal I and Jafar Pasha?. 
The British tried to create a constitutional monarchy, ruled by members of the Arab elite 
in public and by British officers such as Percy Cox in private. Deeply influenced by Europe’s 
racist social attitudes and imperialist policies, these British officers fashioned a government 
administration that incorporated the previous Ottoman tendency to favor members of the ruling 
(and not necessarily local) Sunni aristocracy, and built upon this system of Sunni favoritism by 
formalizing the political marginalization of the Shia majority and many minority groups under 
the law.5 Since this period, many Iraqi civilians and politicians have abhorred such racist 
                                               
3
 Dodge, Toby. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-building and a History Denied. New York: Columbia UP, 2003.p. 5 
4
 Simon, Reeva S., and Eleanor Harvey Tejirian. The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921. New York: Columbia UP, 2004. 
5
 Fontana, Guiditta. "Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 
1919-23." Middle Eastern Studies 46 (2010): 1-16.p 14 
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exclusionary policies that are disadvantageous to the majority of the population, but the roots of 
this system shaped Iraqi state and society in the decades that follow.  
Within Chapter One about the British Mandate, as in those that follow, I will attempt to 
strike a balance between maintaining a diversity of sources and focusing on those sources that 
are most relevant to my research topic. Among the set of sources consulted in this chapter, I 
found the primary sources, including letters written by Gertrude Bell, Jafar Pasha, and King 
Faisal I particularly insightful. Bell’s letters showed the extent of British favoritism of the Sunni 
minority and mistrust of the other factions of the Iraqi population.6 In contrast, in their private 
letters to one another, Faisal and Jafar Pasha revealed the political struggles of those who 
considered themselves to be Iraqi nationals of trying to do what was best for their country and 
people, but being limited by the oppressive power of a foreign occupation.7 The product of this 
compromise, while well intentioned, laid the foundation for many of the political and social 
struggles seen in Iraq today. I also relied on the scholarship of several historians, including most 
prominently Guiditta Fontana. In her article Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-
religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 1919-1923, she investigates the 
policies in the early years of the British occupation and their effect on how ethnic and religious 
communities in their related to the new Iraqi state. The combination of primary and secondary 
sources, in addition to sources that gave a voice to both foreign administrators and Iraqi citizens, 
allowed me to gain a more well-rounded and comprehensive perspectives on this period of Iraq’s 
history. 
Chapter Two will give a brief summary of the change in administrations following the 
end of the British Mandate and resume the narrative with the rise of the Ba’ath Party, particularly 
                                               
6
 Bell, Gertrude Lowthian. The Letters of Gertrude Bell. Vol. II. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927. p. 578 
7
 Askari, Jafar, William Facey, and Najdat Fath	i. S	afwat. A Soldier's Story: from Ottoman Rule to Independent Iraq : the 
Memoirs of Jafar Pasha Al-Askari (1885-1936). London: Arabian Pub., 2003. p. 240 
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under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein from 1979-2003. During this period, Iraq witnessed 
the rise to power of a despotic ruler with absolute power over and zero tolerance for political 
dissent. Through organized killings of alleged or real political enemies within the Ba’ath Party, 
Hussein shaped Iraq’s government in such a way that it began to conform to his political vision, 
that of absolute, personal rule .8 Increasingly paranoid and suspicious of even his most trusted 
compatriots, the dictator continued to consolidate his power until the Party represented little 
more than an inner circle Saddam’s relatives and tribal members. Questions that will be posed 
and discussed in this chapter include; How did Saddam change the existing concept of Iraqi 
national identity to suit his own political goals?, When and why did Saddam begin to use state-
sponsored violence against civilians to divide and rule his subjects to maximize his power?, and 
How did Saddam portray or justify large-scale acts of violence against specific communities to 
the Iraqi population? 
There exists a great deal of scholarship focusing on Iraq under the Ba’ath Party and 
Hussein’s dictatorship. However, there are fewer primary sources for this period than for the 
Mandate chapter due to the state’s heavy use of censorship and repression during this period. I 
therefore used primarily secondary sources but focused on those that include first-hand accounts 
that give a voice to Iraqis who witnessed or were subjected to atrocities during this period, along 
with the most relevant analytical scholarship. For example, I relied on Kevin Woods’ study 
entitled The Saddam Tapes: the Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime to reveal the inner 
workings of Hussein’s regime. This book is composed of translations of videotape and audiotape 
recordings of Ba’ath Party meetings during Hussein’s presidency. In particular, it reveals some 
of his cabinet members’ perspectives on controversial state activities such as the Anfal 
Campaign and the American involvement during the Gulf War. In addition, collections of 
                                               
8
 Kelly, Michael. Martyrs Day: Chronicle of a Small War. New York: Random House, 1993. P. 34 
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interviews of Iraqi refugees in Turkey, Iran, and Syria by Human Rights Watch provided 
eyewitness accounts of Hussein’s gross violations of human rights during the genocide against 
the Kurds and episode large-scale violence against civilians in Basra in what came to be known 
as “The Shia Uprisings”. Secondary sources such as Sandra Mackey’s The Reckoning: Iraq and 
the Legacy of Saddam Hussein offer academic analysis of many themes central to this chapter. 
Adeed Dawisha’s article, "Identity" and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq, was particularly 
helpful in exploring the political manipulation of national identity during this period. Overall, 
these sources among others used throughout the chapter helped to provide a balance between 
eyewitness accounts of Iraqi experiences during Hussein’s dictatorship and scholarly analysis of 
identity and state-sponsored violence. 
Chapter Three will focus on the role of the U.S.-led Coalition played in the collapse of 
the Iraqi state and the development of communal violence from 2003 to the present. Following 
the Gulf War and the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq suffered under decade-long debilitating economic 
sanctions that impoverished its population and weakened, but did not defeat, Saddam Hussein’s 
dictatorship.9 In 2003, U.S. military forces invaded Iraq, topped Hussein’s regime and army, and 
attempted to reconstruct a government and armed forces that would ensure stability and security 
throughout the country and guarantee equal treatment under the law for all Iraqi citizens. 
However, what resulted from these efforts was the collapse of Iraqi state, followed by the 
fragmentation of Iraqi society across ethnic and religious lines. The chapter will trace the 
evolution of political faction and religiously based militia groups that utilized sectarian 
ideologies to commit large-scale acts of violence against civilian and attempt to isolate and 
analyze and main reasons behind this movement. Some of the most central questions guiding my 
                                               
9
 Gonzalez, Nathan. The Sunni-Shia Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East. Mission Viejo, CA: Nortia, 
2009. p. 101 
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analysis of this historical period include, Why did the use of large-scale violence to enforce a 
particular interpretation of Iraqi identity change and move from state to civilian hands at this 
particular time, as opposed to other tumultuous and unstable periods of Iraq’s history? What are 
the most essential contributing factors to the rise of sectarian violence in Iraq? To what extent is 
the United States responsible for the collapse of Iraqi society and political conflict with factions 
and militias based on sectarian identities?, and What role did Iraqi agency play in the 
fragmentation of society and the development of large-scale violence against civilians?. 
This chapter will rely on a combination of primary and secondary sources focusing on 
Iraq from 2003 to the present in order to achieve a comprehensive view on Iraq’s current 
situation from both and academic as well as a ground level perspective. It has been one of my 
goals throughout the thesis is to present Iraqi perspectives and experiences whenever possible, 
since I was unable, for obvious reasons, to conduct my own interviews and research in Iraq. To 
achieve this goal for this specific time period, I relied mainly on the interviews compiled by 
Time Magazine reporter Mark Kukis in his collection Voices from Iraq: A People's History, 
2003-2009, which includes interviews with Iraqi citizens about their opinions of the American 
Occupation and its effects on Iraqi lives. Nathan Gonzalez’s study entitled, The Sunni-Shia 
Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East, represents a scholarly analysis of 
the background history of sectarian violence in the Middle East and provided a solid background 
for my own analysis. In order to understand the US military actions in Iraq from an American 
perspective, I relied on military journals such as Parameters and Joint Force Quarterly, which 
provided insightful into the challenges to maintaining stability in the country and combating 
powerful foreign and domestic militia groups. In order to study the Iraqi agency in manipulating 
Iraqi identity through violent tactics, I consulted various reports from the International Crisis 
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Group. In sum, I consulted a variety of sources in this chapter in the hope of constructing a well-
rounded, unbiased narrative of one of the country’s most complicated periods of history and to 
present my argument regarding the political use of national and sectarian identities as a political 
tool from multiple angles.  
 
Goals for Contribution to the Field of Middle Eastern Studies and the History of Modern 
Iraq 
 
Many scholars have carefully researched the history of modern Iraq, playing close 
attention to important topics such as identity politics, violence, and state repression within the 
context of one specific period of time or government administration. The work of these 
academics has been essential to my own research and has greatly contributed to my own 
knowledge and understanding of Iraq’s precarious situation in the present day of political 
instability and deep-seated political and societal fragmentation, which has only been aggravated 
by the onset of communal violence following the US invasion and occupation in 2003. However, 
most of these studies focus on a particular regime or historical period when exploring these 
topics within the context of Iraq. By keeping a close focus on a few central themes over a large 
period of time, I believe that I have made an important contribution and uncovered long-term 
trends and developments that have received little attention. This thesis will trace the history of 
the use of Iraqi identity as a political tool of the state, explore how and when violence became 
the primary tool for hardening these identities as divisive political ones, and ask how these 
historical realities gave rise to the outbreak of communal violence in the contemporary period 
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when the state collapsed under the weight of direct military intervention and flawed strategies of 
















































Introduction to the Mandate Era 
 
 
 The modern nation-state of Iraq, like many of its neighboring Middle Eastern countries, 
finds its roots in an artificial, haphazard creation by European imperialist powers, in this case 
Great Britain, as part of a mission to civilize the region and assert control over its natural 
resources. Following World War I, imperialist nations sought to control the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire, but could not afford the system of direct colonial rule that has presided over 
subjects in India and Africa in the past centuries. Consequently, they created the Mandate 
system. Under this order, Britain and other European powers assumed control over regions 
including Iraq under the guise of preparing them for independence.10 As part of this new system, 
Britain assumed control over the three Ottoman provinces formerly known as the governorates  
Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, and began the arduous task of governing a people with which it had 
no cultural ties or national identity. They created an artificial state to serve their economic and 
political interests.11 Through the Mandate’s “empire by treaty”, the British granted Iraq a limited 
form of independence that permitted limited control over domestic affairs while still maintaining 
a military presence of British military, access to natural resources and control over foreign 
policy.12  In order to establish a new country based on a cohesive national identity, the British 
had to create a cohesive polity from the social landscape composed of approximately 50% Shia 
Arabs, 20% Sunnis, 20% Kurds, and 10% Christian and Jewish sects.13  
In order to accomplish the arduous task of constructing a state from only loosely 
associated provinces, the British established an administration in which one’s religious and 
ethnic identity determined accessibility to the state and legitimacy as an Iraqi citizen. In 
                                               
10Dodge, Toby. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-building and a History Denied. New York: Columbia UP, 2003.p. 5 
11Fontana, Guiditta. "Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 
1919-23." Middle Eastern Studies 46 (2010): 1-16.p 3.  
12Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004. p. 193 
13Simon, Reeva S., and Eleanor Harvey Tejirian. The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921. New York: Columbia UP, 2004. 
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particular, this system relied on British notions of Sunni superiority and assured this minority 
group a dominant seat in Iraqi politics. The unequal distribution of political power among the 
religious and ethnic groups was deliberately designed to fragment the people to avoid the 
emergence of a strong national identity that would challenge British authority. This is not to say 
that ethnic or religious conflict in Mesopotamia, particularly conflict between the Sunni and Shia 
sects of the population, did not exist prior to the British occupation. On the contrary, conflicts 
between these communities were historically well documented in numerous accounts of small-
scale conflicts or episodes of violence. The principle change in ethnic and religious interactions 
from this state lies in the politicization of these previously social identities. In incorporating 
these identities into the political arena by giving citizens differential access to the state, the 
mandate system legitimized existing grievances and laid the groundwork for future organized, 
large-scale ethnic and religious violence in the name of the new Iraqi state.  
 In the early stages of the Mandate, British views of the indigenous population, namely 
their inability to govern themselves and their propensity for violence, shaped the creation of a 
new Iraqi government that would rely on religious and ethnic labels to determine power in 
politics. Between 1919 and 1920, the British Expedition Army noted that the Arabs had a 
propensity towards murder and theft, but could be corrected with the guiding hands of British 
officers.14 Regarding the people of the region, Gertrude Bell observed, “The Oriental is like a 
very old child…He is not practical in our acceptance of the world, any more than a child is 
practical, and his utility is not ours”. 15 Like other British orientalists analyzing state formation in 
Iraq, Bell took on a paternalistic tone in her categorization of Mesopotamians and believed that 
the feat of statehood could not be achieved without the British, as the superior race, maintaining 
                                               
14Dodge, p. 23 
15Dodge, p. 64 
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control over the process. She continued, “Mesopotamia is not a civilized state, it is largely 
composed of wild tribes who do not wish to shoulder the burden and expense of citizenship”.16 
In this instance, Bell created an image of a population that would not take part in the task of state 
making not only because they were inferior, but lacked interest and willingly left this burden to 
the British. Such views were widespread among the British and later influenced the political 
structure of the new state.  
 
British Justifications for the Mandate 
 
 While the justifications for the Mandate were many, one of the most prevalent is the view 
that the British were defending Mesopotamia from “the Turks” in the midst of the crumbling 
Ottoman Empire. In 1922, the Manchester Guardian published the following justification in 
London:  
The principle reason against evacuation  is that it would immediately invite the return 
of the Turk. That is not a destiny we should desire for Irak, and its effects would extend 
at once to the other regions detached from Turkey by the war- to Syria, to Palestine, 
and so to Egypt. But if we do not withdraw from Irak, the alternative is to support her 
Government, although with as little interference and at as little cost as possible to 
ourselves, since her Government can certainly not stand alone.17  
 
This commentary suggests not only Britain’s perceptions of Iraqis, but also their intention 
to hold on their new informal empire, while keeping other imperial powers, such as France, from 
taking over the region. The British asserted that, since Iraqis were incapable of successfully 
governing the region and defending it against foreign invasion, they must remain in control lest 
Turkey returned to reclaim control over Mesopotamia. Furthermore, the periodical mentions the 
fear among imperialist nations that giving independence or loosening control over one area, such 
                                               
16Bell, Gertrude Lowthian. The Letters of Gertrude Bell. Vol. II. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1927. p. 578 
17The Manchester Guardian. Oct 12, 1922 
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as Iraq, would throw the whole region into chaos. This is particularly troubling for European 
powers vying  for territories in the same region, such as Britain and France: not only did Britain 
want to block a possible Turkish threat, but also competition from other European countries.  
 A second way in which the British justified the Mandate was by asserting that they were 
performing a service for the Iraqis, who could not free themselves from Ottoman rule without 
being liberated by a colonial power. In 1917, Major General Stanley Maude assured the 
population in Baghdad that the British had not come as conquerors or enemies, but rather a 
liberating power for the Iraqi people.18 In this case, while notions of racial superiority are 
obvious, the British emphasized the portrayal of Iraqis as victims of the tyrannical Ottoman 
Empire and waiting for a superior power to liberate them.19 In the case, they made a key 
distinction regarding the subjugation of the indigenous population by a foreign power; if done by 
a non-European power, they were portrayed as brutish and evil, while if done by Europeans it 
was out of concern for the well being of the colonized people.20 
In order to complement their perspective as liberators, the British perceived the Iraqi 
population as grateful for their presence, as if the occupation was voluntary. In her letters to her 
family in London, Gertrude Bell wrote, “Baghdad is a mass of roses and congratulations. They 
are genuinely delighted to be free of the Turks”.21  The assumption that Iraqis welcomed British 
presence also served to remove blame or perception of injustice, as seen in the portrayal of the 
Turks. However, while documented Iraqi viewpoints on the British are hard to come by from this 
period, the few available examples show a difference between the actual Iraqi voices and those 
imagined by the British; these informants are also almost never identified by name. In an 
                                               
18Simon, p. 23 
19Dodge, p. 44 
20Dodge, p. 44 
21Bell, p. 406 
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interview with an Iraqi Bedouin woman, Gertrude Bell was confused by her perception of 
society under the British mandate. The woman challenged Bell by asking, “Ah! The rivers of 
tears, the floods of human misery that these waifs represent. What is life worth in this age of 
violence?”.22 Such commentary challenges the voices of British officials who insisted that Iraqis 
were enjoying a greater quality of life now that they had been freed from the Turks and were not 
governed by Great Britain. In fact, the quality of life for many Iraqis had diminished through this 
period of political instability. The difference between the British officers’ attitudes about their 
actions in Iraq as helping what they viewed as an inferior race in juxtaposition to brief quotes 
from the Iraqi people such as this mark a strong discord in viewpoints between the colonizers 
and the indigenous population that remains a theme throughout the Mandate period, and would 
manifest itself in the structuring of political identities in the new administration. 
 
Centralizing Sunni Power  
 
British authorities established the new Iraqi government fairly quickly and restructured 
identities of the region that now developed into legal categories in addition to constituting the 
traditional social association. In 1920, secular nationalists united with Shia tribesmen to 
overthrow what they collectively viewed as a British foreign occupation, rejecting the 
justifications presented by British officers and periodicals. This is not to romanticize the state of 
social tensions between the two religious divisions prior to British presence in the region; small-
scale conflicts between Sunni and Shia groups were documented prior to this time period. 
However, the cooperation of these groups against the British demonstrated an ability to 
compromise, to work towards the establishment of an Iraqi state that transcended the boundaries 
                                               
22Bell, p. 438 
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drawn by religious or ethnic sect. While some Shia clerics were determined to construct a more 
Islamic government, this was not a consensus among Iraq’s Shia population. Despite evidence 
that the Shia population was willing to work with the new administration, the British determined 
that Iraq must be ruled by Sunnis, whom they viewed as more secular and more willing to accept 
the guidelines set forth by colonial powers. In particular, they favored an elite group of educated 
Sunnis whose families had previously worked with colonial powers and who could claim some 
sort of hereditary, aristocratic legitimacy among the Arab people. Therefore, the British chose 
Faisal , son of Sharif Hussein of the Hijaz, to become the first king of Iraq. With a new 
figurehead chosen, the Iraqi state was established in 1923.23 Constitutional Assembly elections 
took place the following year, resulting in an overwhelming political advantage for the Sunnis 
over the Shia.24 In 1925, the new administration passed the Organic Law, which declared Iraq a 
hereditary constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary assembly. Islam was declared the 
official religion, although Sharia courts only preside over personal status affairs; the government 
was left secular.25 In 1932, Iraq obtained formal independence and was admitted to the League of 
Nations; however, this technical independence did not end British interference in Iraqi affairs, 
and the colonial power still largely controlled the new monarchy as stated in the terms of the 
1932 Anglo-Iraqi agreement26. 
The creation of a government controlled by Sunnis was a carefully selected strategy put 
in place after the British had deliberated several other options, including breaking the country 
into several states of similar ethnic and religious composition. The latter strategy proved 
unrealistic because no such homogeneous regions existed in Iraq. Diverse groups of the 
                                               
23Fontana, p. 12 
24Fontana, p. 12 
25Cleveland, p. 207 
26Cleveland, p. 208 
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population had coexisted before any foreign presence. Only after this strategy proved unrealistic 
did London decide to construct a Sunni Arab government.27 While a numerical minority in Iraq, 
the Sunnis had enjoyed an advantage over the rest of the population in terms of political power 
since Ottoman times, when they represented the educated elite of Baghdad. The British took this 
existing advantage during the Mandate era and cemented their previously existing advantage 
through false elections28 and through promoting only Sunni candidates from upper class 
backgrounds.29 Through promoting the rise of Sunni political power throughout this period, the 
colonial power created a system of differential access to the state based on previously existing 
social identities, which had now been further hardened and politicized.  
The first step in cementing Sunni authority over the new Iraqi administration involved 
importing the British strategy used in India of creating a new class of the indigenous population 
to act as an intermediary body between the colonial power and the masses. Thomas Babington 
Macaulay of the East India Trade Company described this objective: “to create a class of 
persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect”.30 
Percy Cox, Gertrude Bell and other British representatives in Iraq engaged in this process by 
selecting Sunnis of an elite background to run a Western-style government that incorporated a 
few elements of Iraqi customs to bolster their legitimacy, while still allowing for the British to 
wield most of the political power31. A.T. Wilson32 also noted in his memoirs that the most 
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successful way of fashioning the new Iraqi state was to organize political rule based on racial or 
ethnic, rather than geographical or economic factors.33 When British powers were still supporting 
Kurdish autonomy in Mosul, they selected Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji as head of the Kurdish 
national movement, while Sunnis were appointed to positions of authority in Baghdad.34 
Furthermore, the British believed that the Sunnis must constitute this new class because 
incorporating the majority Shia population into the political decision-making process would lead 
to a rejection of a secular government and the creation of a theocratic state.35 This preference for 
Sunni rulers showed that the British believed that the Shia were inferior due to unchangeable 
differences in their thinking based on their religious background. Overall, in order to justify the 
new administration, the British portrayed the Shia tribes as backwards and more simplistic than 
Sunnis, who were in their view more willing to accept the new government approved and 
controlled by Great Britain. They assumed that Shia disapproval of the new government was 
based entirely on their preference for a theocracy and supposed religious inferiority and not the 
fact that the British were establishing a government in which they were being marginalized. 
The desire for a new Iraqi administration grounded in a specific ethnic and religious 
identity, while the primary goal for the colonial power, did not enjoy the same popularity among 
Iraqi citizens, even those granted limited participation in the process of nation building. One of 
these few Iraqis given authority in this process was Jafar Pasha al-Askari. Jafar Pasha played an 
essential role in the formation of the Iraqi state,  serving as Minister of Defense and then serving 
two terms as the country’s first prime minister.36 Jafar was given access to the state due to his 
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experience as an officer during Ottoman rule, his Sunni background, and his willingness to 
cooperate with British authorities. Like the British, he observed and acknowledged existing 
social tensions among various social groups in Iraq, particularly between Sunni and Shia 
citizens. However, his strategy in addressing this issue diverged from that of the colonialists. In 
his memoirs, he realized the potential power of the state in shaping the social landscape of the 
country and sought to build a cohesive national identity based on multiple religions and 
ethnicities given equal participation. He protested the British strategy of giving differential 
access to the state and believed that the new administration should not discriminate against 
potential candidates based on sectarian identities.37 However, since Britain ultimately held 
authority over the Iraqi administration at this point in time, these strategies were not given 
consideration and disappear from the political discourse.  
 
Faisal: the First King of Iraq 
 
The choice of Faisal I as the first king of Iraq provides insight into British political 
strategy in Iraq and their perceptions of Iraqi preferences for the head of state. First, the move 
can be interpreted as an attempt by the British to mend relations with Husayn, emir of the Hijaz 
and his sons after an assortment of broken political promises made during the McMahon-Hussein 
Correspondence and afterwards.38 A popular figure in the Arab nationalist movement in Syria 
and originally chosen to become the king there, Faisal I was then removed from Damascus as the 
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French assumed control over Syria.39 In an attempt to make up for these botched political 
agreements, the British made Faisal the first king of Iraq, and his brother Abdullah assumed 
control over Transjordan. In addition, Faisal was seen as a good choice because the British 
sought to install someone as king who agreed to “reign but not govern”, thus ensuring that 
British interests would be protected while projecting the image of Iraqi independence and 
nationalism.40 Percy Cox, Gertrude Bell and other orientalists believed that his family heritage 
and Sunni legacy would appeal to the Sunni elite, while his reputation for religious tolerance 
would appease the majority Shia population.41 
Despite hopes that Faisal would serve as a tool for Iraqi nationalism due to his prestigious 
family background and Sunni heritage, the fact remained that Iraq received a foreigner to serve 
as the first king of a new monarchy orchestrated by European imperialists. There was little room 
in this system for Iraqi influence on this process, and this became apparent during the run-up to 
the elections. In order to promote the image of a democratic process in Iraq, British officers sent 
representatives out to Basra, Baghdad and Mosul to gather public opinion about potential 
candidates and to rally support around Faisal.42 However, when citizens asked about other 
candidates, these representatives had to admit that there were none. Reports refer to members of 
the public wishing to get rid of the Mandate altogether or to support a candidate who is not 
directly supported by the British as “extremists”, who were viewed with suspicion.43 In 1921, the 
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British-controlled party unanimously nominated Faisal, who consequently won the plebiscite 
with a reported 96% of the vote.44 
Faisal’s image as an Iraqi nationalist was deeply compromised after the elections  due to 
his lack of real political power. As noted in the Guardian in  1922: 
He is already not popular with some of his subjects, and the more he is thought to be a 
mere instrument in our hands, the more enemies he is certain to have. Especially will 
this be so if, at our instruction, he imposes taxation upon them in order, as seems to be 
intended, to repay us for the public utilities that we have handed over to him.45 
 
Here, the British realized that Faisal’s reputation as a tool for the colonialists is prohibiting a 
strong national identity and a feeling of true independence. While Percy Cox46 promoted an 
image of a more independent monarch in the country, he conceded very little power to Faisal and 
was often deeply suspicious of his ability to govern his own nation as an Arab ruler. On his 
inherent abilities to reason and successfully govern Iraq, Cox noted, “He has in recent episodes 
unmistakably displayed the cloven hoof. I have endeavored to be absolutely straightforward and 
frank with him, and to treat him like a brother, but there you are, when he is scratched deep 
enough the racial weakness displays itself”.47 Cox also intervened in events such as in 1922 
when Faisal attempted to disagree with the British over a treaty, acting as ruler until such 
documents were signed and enacted.48 Thus, while his family background and Sunni status made 
him a more desirable ruler in the eyes of the British than a Shia, very little change in the way of 
self-governance materialized after Faisal’s election. 
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Faisal’s own thoughts regarding the status of Iraq at this time showed a concern over a 
lack of national identity and an inability to exercise independence from the British. His position 
as ruler over Iraq was frustrating to him. He needed to cooperate with the British in order to have 
any power in the construction of the Iraqi state, but doing so alienated him from the Iraqi people 
and forced him to abandon his own goals for the country. In a letter to Prime Minister Jafar 
Pasha, he expressed his concerns over the new state:  
It is true that we set out to achieve more, but what more can we do now? … I am only 
sorry that our people, in their ignorance of how hard we have had to fight, have 
opposed rather than supported us. We stood our ground and how we are on our way 
home, and although we did not obtain “complete independence”, we did manage to 
achieve an honorable compromise. Nobody can blame us for having done our utmost.49 
 
It is important to note his frustration over having so little power to challenge British interests. 
The concern expressed in his correspondence showed that he was not an apathetic bystander to 
the colonial power controlling Iraq, but that he attempted to use his privileged status to achieve a 
watered-down compromise with the British for lack of an a better option. In regards to the lack 
of a cohesive identity in Iraq, he observed,  
In this regard and with my heart filled with sadness, I have to say that it is my belief 
that there is no Iraqi people inside Iraq. There are only diverse groups with no national 
sentiments. They are filled with superstitions and false religious traditions with no 
common grounds between them…It is our responsibility to form out of this mass one 
people that we would then guide, train and educate.50 
 
Faisal revealed a deep concern over the lack of an identity and a worry that societal rifts already 
present in the three provinces would become hardened and fragmented without a large effort on 
the part of the state to unify all religions and ethnicities under a national identity. 
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Ramifications for the Shia under the New Administration 
 
The political marginalization of the majority Shia population was another central theme 
in the new Iraqi administration. Viewed as backwards and adverse to a democratic system in 
Iraq, the Shia were given little opportunity to participate in the new administration from its 
inception. British representatives at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, determined to 
legitimize their choice of favoring Sunni elite power in the new government, refused to 
acknowledge that the majority of Iraq was Shia.51 Instead, they painted a picture of a country 
largely populated by Sunnis and plagued by minority Shia population staunchly refusing to 
consent to British rule. This prejudice was further politicized in 1924 when administration passed 
a law defining and categorizing Iraqi citizenship. Under this law, government officials defined a 
specific category of citizens, “Iraqis of Iranian origin”, and added this label to their identification 
cards. By including this label on official documents, the government was able to discriminate 
against these citizens due to their origins and legitimizes inferiority at the state level.52 
British discourse concerning the Shia during the mandate period revealed their 
assumption that religious difference was a divisive factor and should prohibit the Shia 
community from exercising political power in the new regime. Gertrude Bell described these 
citizens as “more Islamic” than their Sunni counterparts.53 This concept challenged traditional 
categorization of Islamic sects, which usually considered Sunnism to be the more orthodox party. 
In Bell’s case, the “Islamic” denotes a stronger association with a more extremist adherence to 
religious values and a way of thinking that she saw as both inferior and incompatible with the 
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British-controlled government. While taking advantage of existing tribal ties to control rural 
areas, the more powerful individuals of the Shia community were left out of the political 
discourse in Baghdad. Bell expressed her contempt for these leaders in the following passage: 
It’s a problem here how to get in touch with the Shias, not the tribal people in the 
country; we’re on intimate terms with all of them, but the grimly devout citizens of the 
holy towns and more especially the leaders of the religious opinion, the Mujtahids, who 
can loose the bind with a word by authority which rests on the intimate acquaintance  
with accumulated knowledge  entirely irrelevant to human affairs and worthless in any 
branch of human activity. There they  sit in an atmosphere which reeks of antiquity and 
is so thick with the dust of ages that you can’t see through it- nor can they.54  
 
Here, Bell created an image of the Shia leadership so steeped in ancient traditions that they are 
impermeable to the reasoning of the modern era. She reinforced this notion by frequently 
referring to them as “extremists” in her letters. The word choice used in describing Shia clerics 
and other leaders of the Shia community had lasting effects in terms of political representation 
and social notions of the group. 
Angered by a foreign occupation that intentionally marginalized their community, the 
Shia organized a revolt against British rule in 1920 and then in 1922 in response to the new 
treaty. Some Shia wished to install an Islamic republic, however the main point of protest for the 
majority of the community was foreign rule.55 For example, political activist Muhammad Al-
Sadr founded Haras al-Istiqlal, a nationalist party aimed at uniting the sects in Iraq to promote a 
cohesive national identity and administration.56 While the assertion that all Shia rejected all 
forms of government except for an Islamic republic was therefore inaccurate, this fact was 
eclipsed by the mounting British tension against the Shia after this rebellion, even after officers 
were able to stabilize the region. After this display of antagonism towards British rule, Percy 
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Cox intentionally kept the Shia out of negotiations towards the 1922 treaty in attempt to “clip 
their wings”.57 Moreover, the Shia were further marginalized after the revolt, and the causes for 
such a rebellion, including legitimate Shia grievances over a lack of power, were dismissed. Bell 
responded to the revolt with the following: “The unthinking people who form the great mass of 
the world, follow suit in a blind revolt against an accepted order”.58 She argued that the revolts 
had no legitimacy because they were led by anti-British extremists. She therefore discredited the 
concerns of the Shia masses of being left out of the political discourse and eliminated the 
possibility of negotiation for a more equal political representation during this period.  
After 1920, the British executed harsh punishment against Shia members of the 
population who tried to rebel against the administration. In June of 1923, the son of Grand 
Mujtahid Mahdi al-Khalisi was arrested for attaching a fatwa on a door to a mosque, in which he 
called for businesses at the local bazaar to close in protest of the British-controlled government.59 
Authorities quickly responded by deporting him and three members of his family to Persia, while 
other Shia leaders followed in protest.60 The tactic of revoking one’s citizenship as punishment 
for political dissent reveals the lack of choice Iraqis had in accepting British control and favored 
a strong hold over the region over a concern for national unity. By eliminating dissenters, the 
British administration was able to eliminate dissent without incorporating the Shia into the 
national political landscape.  
However damaging to the future of political unity in Iraq, the strategy of deporting 
political dissidents proved to be effective in terms of quelling rebellion. In November of 1923, 
Shia leaders still in exile in Persia issued a statement to king Faisal I stating that they were 
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mistaken in their actions and that, while they wanted greater Shia representation in the 
government, they consented to the Sunni-dominated administration if they were allowed back 
into Iraq. They were permitted to return from exile, but not before withdrawing all fatwas against 
the British and agreeing to refrain from all political activity.61 Therefore, the Shia were left with 
less political voice after 1923 and even less bargaining power. 
The primary issue in the treatment of the Shia community in these early years of the 
mandate was the blatant denial of their majority status in Iraq along with the assertion that their 
religious beliefs constituted an inherent incompatibility with the semi-democratic institution that 
the British installed. For example, Cornwallis, advisor to the Ministry of the Interior categorized 
the Shia as follows: “Their religious beliefs alone prevent them from countenancing the Iraqi 
government and I believe that when they set out from Karbala’ the other day they would have 
raised a rebellion had they had any encouragement”.62 This categorization ignored the fact that 
the Shia in Iraq had previously lived in mixed communities and that they had legitimate reasons 
for opposing the new government. They were purposefully marginalized by the British, who put 
Sunnis in power while they exiled Shia leaders. British authorities harshly reprimanded the Shia 
for revolting against the new government, but unlike the Sunni community, they were given no 
incentive to support it. Rather, the British chastised the Shia for rejecting the new state while 
treating them in a manner that ensured that they would. By emphasizing their religion as a 
divisive factor, the British actively fragmented Iraqi politics and by association, Iraqi society. 
 
The Kurds: a Challenge to the New Nation 
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Unlike the Shia, who were involuntarily kept from being fully incorporated and 
represented in the new Iraqi state, the Kurds actively sought an independent state for themselves, 
yet were forced to become part of Iraq. In this situation, the Kurds represented an opposition to a 
new Iraqi national identity. The origins of Kurdish disinterest in becoming part of Iraq stemmed 
from Britain’s broken political promises to the people of Mosul. While the British originally 
supported an autonomous state, they later changed their strategy and decided to incorporate 
Mosul into Iraq, largely because they sought to profit from natural resources, including suspected 
oil deposits in the region.63 In addition, the Kurds were incorporated into the new state due to 
their Sunni identity, allowing for increase in the percentage of Sunnis in Iraq to counteract the 
Shia majority.64 The Treaty of Sevres, which dismantled the Ottoman Empire in 1920, also 
included a clause for an independent Kurdish state; however, this was never enforced.65 The 
Kurds, angered over this injustice, were reluctant to join Iraq and did not forget the unfulfilled 
promises of the Treaty of Sevres.  
The incorporation of Mosul began with British officers and members of the League of 
Nations sending representatives to the region to gather information about the population and 
their attitudes about the evolving socio-political situation of the Mandate era. Prior to visiting the 
region, these representatives assumed that the residents of Mosul would want to be divided along 
ethnic lines, despite the fact that these communities had been mixed for centuries.66 
Commissioners were confused after interviewing a population more concerned with economic, 
historical and political issues than ethnic or religious ones. They also noted that identities could 
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be rather fluid; some residents switched their identity from Turk to Arab with the fall of Ottoman 
power.67 Wallace Lyon, who spent the majority of his career with the British government in the 
Kurdish region, also reported that it was composed of a variety of ethnicities, cultures and 
languages.68 While small-scale conflicts existed, this lack of cohesion did not cause any great 
unrest or uprising.  
While the British were careful to promote the image of democracy in Iraq by sending 
surveys out to the Kurdish population, their opinions were often not represented in the 
government. During Faisal’s candidacy, Lyon surveyed various parts of the region regarding 
their opinions on the matter. He wrote, “They were reluctant and asked about other candidates; 
and I was compelled to admit there was none”.69 As with the Shia, Kurdish opinion did  not 
materialize into any kind of social or political change, or an introduction of more than one 
candidate into the election. Overall, the northern region of Iraq was  dissatisfied with the election 
because some areas had not been consulted while others had outright rejected Faisal.70 
The Kurdish community, disappointed with Faisal’s election and frustrated over broken 
agreements over Kurdish autonomy, resisted the moves to make their homeland part of Iraq in 
various pockets of the region, including Suleiman.71 To show that separatist movements would 
not be tolerated, British officer Dobbs bombed the region and put an end to these movements.72 
As seen in the Shia revolts, the British did not hesitate to use violence in order to hold the new 
nation together. However, large-scale violent civilian movements were not yet present at this 
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point in Iraq’s history. Overall, many of the problems of incorporating the Kurds into a cohesive 
Iraqi identity and the political landscape of Iraq stemmed from inconsistency. Britain’s initial 
support for an independent Kurdistan left the population of this region with little motive to want 
to become part of Iraq in the period from 1918 to 1921. 
Iraqi members of the administration, while having little power to express their own 
opinions or strategies beyond the scope of what was approved by the British, differed in their 
opinions on how to deal with the incorporation of Mosul into the Iraqi state. Jafar Pasha, 
acknowledging the lack of a cohesive state identity, noted that no one had set forth a policy or 
program to help unite Arabs and Kurds under the new state since its inception.73 Also absent was 
such a program to incorporate the marginalized Shia. While the British did use force to quell 
revolts directly against their authority, encouraging a strong national identity based on a 
unification of these religious and ethnic sects did not serve their interests because it was easier to 
manage a fragmented region that was less likely to rebel as a unified body. Fearing further 
fragmentation of the country’s society, Jafar Pasha stressed the need to make the Kurds feel as if 
they were part of the nation and not an excluded community. One way to encourage this 
sentiment was to move some government facilities to the Kurdish region and to employ more 
Kurds in the process. He suggested a policy to encourage Iraq’s ethnic groups to move to 
different regions of the country and to intermarry.74 While it is difficult to evaluate the success of 
such programs since they were never enacted, it shows an Iraqi’s knowledge of a current social 
tension and an awareness that further politicization of these identities will lead to a more 
hardened perception of differences and more problems of fragmentation for the Iraqi people. 
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Strategies for Constructing a National Identity 
 
After the establishment of the monarchy, various strategies for the construction of a 
strong national identity began to take shape. For the British, the preferred strategy was to 
contrive a strong identity that leads citizens to identify themselves as Iraqi, but not challenge the 
foreign-controlled government. Conceptually, this is difficult to maintain because a truly 
independent nation would naturally seek to control its own administration and resources and 
sever ties with an imperialist power. In 1922 the London Times noted: “No common purpose yet 
animates these heterogeneous communities... (yet) Mesopotamia, with its vague frontiers and 
mixed population, was treated as a nation, as an embryo State, to be ranked with the modern 
democracies included under the League of Nations.”75 
Therefore, among the various interpretations of an Iraqi nationalist identity presented among in 
the political discourse of this era, the British propagated a particular brand of this notion that 
ensures dependency on the foreign power.  
In what is seen by prominent historians as a missed opportunity to create a cohesive 
notion of Iraqi identity across ethnic and religious sects, Bell and others in charge of building the 
state legitimized existing social grievances by introducing this wrinkle in the Iraqi social fabric 
into the political arena.76 This incorporation was seen as early as the 1920 revolt when Bell 
observed Shia and Sunni sects attending mawlids, services to celebrate the birth of the prophet on 
the same day and some times at the same service. Present on this particular year were mutual 
political and religious speeches aimed at uniting Iraq and expelling the British occupiers.77 In 
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secondary sources as well as her own letters, Gertrude always treated the discovery of integrated 
regions and tribes, or any ambivalent attitudes towards ethnic or religious homogeneity with 
shock and surprise.78 In this situation, the British occupation actually served as a positive force in 
constructing a national identity by providing a common enemy to unite Iraqi citizens. The 
British, aware and perplexed by this phenomenon, continued  to assert that there was a dangerous 
lack of a cohesive identity among the Iraqis and that foreign powers must continue to retain 
control over the region to avoid their own expulsion from the country.  
Contrary to the image of Iraqi nationalism, or lack thereof, painted in the Times article 
cited above, organic movements towards a cohesive national identity were forming in Iraq during 
this time. The main issue for these movements was that they promoted total independence and  
therefore lacked a voice in the British-controlled administration. One varying opinion regarding 
national identity within the administration, however absent in the manifestation of the law in the 
state, was that of Jafar Pasha. While he agreed that there was a problem in Iraq concerning a new 
national identity, he differed from his British counterparts in terms of its origins and possible 
solutions. He acknowledged existing cleavages within the Iraqi social landscape as being a 
domestic issue, but also pointed to the exaggeration of these cleavages and their incorporation 
into the state as the result of the failure of the new administration to address them in a proper 
manner. He wrote,  
The current situation in our country demands urgent action. We must find ways to 
create a unified Iraq with an ideology of Iraqi nationhood, and bring Iraqi society in 
line with the modern world...If we pay no attention to our social fragmentation, how 
can we hope to ever establish a greater Iraqi society based on a single national ideology 
and a common national goal?79  
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As part of the solution to a lack of Iraqi national identity, Jafar Pasha advocated promoting 
nationalism and patriotism in schools based on unity devoid of sectarianism.80 
Two of the most popular concepts among Iraqi nationals to encourage unity were Arab 
nationalism and pan-Arabism.81 Within the country, the concept of Arabism was to forge a 
common identity among the Iraqi people. The term was also used by some officials, such as Jafar 
Pasha, to apply to the Kurds and other minority groups by referring to them as Arab in an effort 
to create a sense of commonality throughout Iraq. In a wider sense, pan-Arabism inspired a sense 
of unity among Arab nations and their grievances against foreign rule. While very popular 
among Iraqis for its stress on unification over regionalism or sectarianism as propagated by the 
state, this concept proved to be a difficult one for the British to reconcile with its Iraqi subjects. 
On one hand, they feared that a feeling of unity throughout Arab nations would inspire the 
population to revolt against colonial powers. On the other, within the borders of Iraq, the 
movement was popular among different strata of society and presented multiple groups as 
legitimate members of the state. Therefore, the British were both fearful and intolerant of pan-
Arabism, but risked angering the Iraqi population by outwardly admitting this and therefore 
exhibited a limited, if not outright false, form of tolerance.  
 Apart from direct participants in the political administration such as Jafar Pasha and 
Faisal, other prominent Iraqi thinkers of this time actively promoted a form of Iraqi nationalism 
and unity absent in Britain’s political discourse in the region. One such thinker is ‘Abd al-Fatah 
Ibrahim. Born in 1906 and educated at the American University of Beirut and Columbia 
University, Ibrahim was a prominent Iraqi scholar during the 1930’s as the new nation searched 
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for a concept of unity to form a strong sense of nationalism.82 He noted that nationalism, due to 
its powerful nature, can be a constructive or destructive force: if citizens are made to feel that 
they have a stake in the decision-making process of the country, they are likely to feel a 
collective consciousness with the rest of the population. Unlike many ideas being propagated by 
the colonial power during this time, Ibrahim argued that a common ethnicity is not necessary to 
forge a strong sense of commonality, as many nations are a compilation of backgrounds (the 
United States, for example) had formed a strong national identity despite existing social 
cleavages. 
Britain’s exercise of power in quashing the pan-Arab movement was seen primarily in its 
rejection of Faisal’s movements towards unity with other Arab leaders. In 1932, Faisal I engaged 
in talks with Arab nations and wanted to hold a conference in Baghdad with their representatives, 
but Britain feared they would discuss politically sensitive topics like Palestine and Syria that 
could potentially endanger colonialist power in the region and denied his request.83 Four years 
later, Faisal and rulers in Saudi Arabia initiate a treaty to protect Arab interests in Palestine and 
Syria, but he was pressured once again to end these discussions.84 Thus, while popular concept 
among Iraqi citizens and viewed as a possible solution to the lack of a cohesive identity, pan-
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The government installed by the British during the Mandate period, while short-lived, set 
the precedent for politicizing ethnic and religious identities in Iraq and giving citizens different 
rights and privileges based on these identities at the state level. From 1936 to 1941, the young 
nation was thrown into turmoil by a series of military coups, but then enjoyed relative stability 
until a military coup in 1958 officially ended the British-installed monarchy.85 While the coup 
defeated the monarchy, it did not erase the hardened and politicized ethnic and religious 
identities that have become  an unfortunate component of Iraqi society up until present day. 
Throughout the Mandate period, these identities were stressed and seen as such an essential 
aspect of state and individual relations that the ethnic conflict seen in later periods becomes 
inevitable. In addition, while ethnic and religious cohesion as a national identity failed during 
this period due to the complex and diverse mosaic of Iraqi society, there was no alternative that 
successfully glued the nation together by the fall of the monarchy, resulting in a weak and fragile 
state. At the close of the Mandate era, several contributing factors to ethnic sectarian violence, 
such as politicized identities and institutionalized discrimination, were already well embedded 
into Iraqi society. The Mandate period, however, could not alone be isolated as the cause of such 
conflicts seen in more contemporary periods of the nation’s history as violence remained a 
largely untapped tool of interaction between the state and specific communities within the Iraqi  
population. 
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Introduction: from the Mandate to Saddam’s Dictatorship 
 
The British Mandate era was not only a failure in terms of constructing a unified Iraqi 
state and a stable government, but also left a long-standing legacy of strained interactions 
between the state and Iraqi citizens based on their religious or ethnic background.  In terms of 
structure, the administration left by the British quickly unraveled and exposed the nation to a 
series of unstable and short-lived regimes. The monarchy officially came to an end in the 1958 
coup d’état led by ‘Abd al Karim Qasim, who ruled until the Ba’ath Party takeover in 1963.86 
Although this administration lasted only a few years, the break from a foreign-installed 
monarchy and establishment of an independent Iraqi government symbolized the end of 
imperialist rule, a significant step in promoting the construction of national identity, and 
therefore remained an important period in Iraq’s history.87 From Qasim’s administration to the 
Ba’ath party takeover in 1963 and Saddam’s rise to power in 1979, the Iraqi government was 
transformed into a secular, nationalist republic that claimed to treat all Iraqi citizens equally.88 
Despite a complete restructuring after the British Mandate, later administrations continued to 
show unequal treatment when interacting with various parts of Iraq’s diverse population and 
further contributed to the legacy of inequality among ethnic and religious groups. 
 This chapter focuses on the interactions between the state and its citizens of various 
religious and ethnic backgrounds during Saddam Hussein’s rule from 1979 to 2003. The focus 
on Saddam Hussein’s regime provides a strong example of how Iraqis of varied backgrounds 
were treated throughout this long-term arguably stable administration. In addition, this period 
                                               
86
 Woods, Kevin M., David D. Palkki, and Mark Stout. The Saddam Tapes: the Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 
   1978-2001. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. p. 113 
87
 Mackey, Sandra. The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein. New York: Norton, 2002. , p. 188 
88
 Woods, p. 113 
Bellini 44
provides a useful point of comparison with the Mandate Era due to the influence of foreign 
players on the construction of communal identities, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War and the 
First Gulf War. Throughout his rule, Saddam Hussein exploited existing tensions between the 
state and civilians of varying ethnic and religious backgrounds cultivated under the Mandate Era 
through two main strategies: the manipulation of nationalist discourse and the use of large-scale 
violence against civilians in order to maintain control over the nation. By portraying individuals 
of different ethnic and sectarian identities as the “other group” during times of instability and 
foreign intervention, Hussein sought to delegitimize the population’s grievances against the 
regime and reassert his own claim to power. Moreover, he forced these groups into submission 
through the powerful tool of violence, including acts of genocide, torture and execution.  
 
The Rise of Saddam Hussein  
 
Saddam Hussein began his political career in Iraq through family connections in the 
Ba’ath Party, and was an active member of the Party well before his presidency. Hussein was 
born on April 28th, 1937 into a very poor family in al-Auja, near Tikrit.89 His father died when he 
was a child and both his mother and stepfather were illiterate and lived in poverty90. He wanted 
to enter the Iraqi military as a way out of poverty, but his lack of social standing and family 
connections kept him from being admitted to the Baghdad Military Academy. In need of an 
alternative career path, Hussein joined the Ba’ath Party in 1959 by utilizing connections 
established in the party through his stepfather’s family and worked within the Party’s security 
apparatus. In 1963, he dropped out of school to marry his cousin Sajida Tulfah and made his 
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work with the Ba’ath Party a full time career.91 At this time, Hussein’s uncle al-Bakr was 
technically president of the party, but he had already begun to amass a great deal of political 
power92. In 1968, current president Abd al-Rahman was forced to resign, and Saddam Hussein 
assumed the position of vice president.93 
 Hussein significantly altered Iraq’s political landscape in 1979 when he became 
president of the Ba’ath Party and commander-in-chief of Iraqi armed forces. He established his 
position of complete authority and exercised the use of fear for purposes of political 
manipulation almost immediately with what is known as “The Night of Long Knives”.94 During 
a party assembly shortly after his inauguration as president, Hussein called out the names of 
twenty-one party members, accused them of being traitors to Iraq by colluding with Syria, and 
sent them before the firing squad. He also invited other members of the party to show their 
loyalty by taking part in the executions.95 He quickly took several more measures to concentrate 
political power completely in his own hands. First, he eliminated all Ba’ath Party rhetoric that 
called Iraq a “popular democracy” that had been popular throughout the 1960’s. On the surface, 
this decision seems to merely reflect a change in semantics without having any palpable impact 
on society. However, removing all mention of democracy reflects his consolidation power and 
any political voice from the Iraqi population. Then, he elevated his family members, including 
his half-brothers Barzan, Watban, and Saba’awi, his step-father Ibrahim Hasan al-Majid, and his 
cousin ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid, to important positions of power within his administration96. By 
placing close family members in these positions, Hussein believed that he could exclude his 
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enemies from power and remove the possibility of internal dissent. In effect, he removed any 
possibility for other politicians to compromise his absolute power in the government as well as 
the military.  Without question, Hussein wasted no time in establishing fear, violence and 
consolidation of family power as political tools to maintain complete control over Iraq from the 
very beginning of his presidency. Hussein’s position on Pan-Arabism, while officially 
emphasized in his speeches as a keystone of Iraqi identity, in reality was almost always 
dismissed in favor of Iraqi nationalism and a distrust of foreign regimes. He refused to negotiate 
with al-Assad, the president of Syria, and instead aimed to construct an identity that was 
uniquely Iraqi and was not influenced by other states.97 
Like earlier heads of administration in Iraq, Hussein recognized the political power of the 
concept of national identity and manipulated it in order to achieve his own political goals. One of 
his most powerful strategies was the complete alignment of national identity with state identity. 
The Ba’ath Party had used these tactics before, but Hussein promoted a personality cult as the 
official face of Iraqi national identity. Therefore, any political disagreement with Saddam or his 
administration became an attack on the entire nation, and citizens expressing this disagreement 
were viewed as a target to be removed.98 The minister of industry presented Hussein to the Iraqi 
people as “the symbol of the Iraqi’s pride and the fluttering flag of the nation…the hope living in 
the conscience of every Arab.99” General Hamadi also noted the strong connection between 
Saddam Hussein and the national identity of every Iraqi, articulating the cult surrounding 
Saddam’s personality as follows: “Saddam. Saddam was the concentration of everything. 
Sometimes you would feel so close to him and other times you felt you were in a cage with a 
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hungry lion”.100 His fear of Hussein’s unpredictable moods showed that even members of his 
own administration could become targets of his brutal violence if they displayed any sense of 
disloyalty or disapproval. Hussein’s birthday was declared a national holiday, and in 1982 the 
National Assembly was instructed to write a pledge of loyalty in blood.101 All state employees, 
including teachers, were forced to join the Ba’ath Party and were fired if they refused.102 
Hussein’s aggressive cult of personality and the feeling of fear he inspired worked well for his 
political career: he ran unopposed throughout his presidency and consistently won 100% of the 
votes in the nation’s obviously rigged elections.103  
 
History of the Ba’ath Party  
 
 Saddam Hussein began his political career through his involvement in the Ba’ath Party, 
which finds its roots not in Iraq, but in nationalist projects in Syria. The Ba’ath Party was 
founded in the 1940’s in Syria by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar under the banner of Arab 
socialism and revolution.104 Clause 6 of the official Permanent Principles of the party stresses its 
nationalist and revolutionary focus: “The Ba’ath is a revolutionary party. It believes that its 
principle aims in realizing an Arab national renaissance and of building socialism will not be 
attained except by revolution and struggle”.105 
 This focus on revolution proved to be popular in Iraq when the Ba’ath Party was 
established there in 1958. Another important aspect of the Party’s focus was Pan-Arabism, a 
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program for unifying the many nations in the Middle East that had been artificially created and 
then subjected to foreign rule. In order to emphasize this point, party founder Aflaq coined the 
term “Arab socialism” to assure that it was perceived as an organic movement and not associated 
with any foreign powers.106 The emphasis on an Arab commonality was a way to move past the 
region’s colonial past and reclaim its own concept of identity, especially since Pan-Arabism and 
Arab nationalism had been denounced by European rulers during the Mandate Era. The Party 
slogan of “unity, freedom, and socialism” was used both to emphasize Pan-Arabism, and to 
promote a cohesive Iraqi national identity.107 Apart from nationalist discourse, the Ba’ath Party 
became popular through several projects aimed at developing Iraq’s economic and social 
sphere.108 For example, the National Development Plan proposed in 1974-1975 outlined the 
Ba’ath Party’s main objectives for Iraq, such as diversifying the economy to lessen the country’s 
dependence on oil, increasing social services, and expanding opportunities for employment 
across diverse socio-economic strata.109 
 Nevertheless, many of the Ba’ath Party’s policies were  flawed. For example, Party 
members stressed Socialism and Republicanism in official discourse, but did little to put this 
rhetoric into action. The Ba’ath party was consistently critical of Western democracies in order 
to emphasize their independence from colonial powers, and claimed that theirs was the truest 
version of democracy worldwide.110 However, most of the key components of a democracy, 
including free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech were absent under 
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Ba’ath Party rule.111 General Raad Hamadi, a former Ba’ath party member who commanded the 
Second Republican Guard Corps until the American Occupation in 2003, noted these 
inconsistencies from his experiences. He described the Ba’ath party as similar to communist 
parties: the rhetoric pertaining to equality and unity was admirable but often failed to 
materialize.112 In addition, one obvious contradiction in the Party’s emphasis on Pan-Arab unity 
was the division between the Syrian and Iraqi Ba’ath parties. The two branches began to drift 
apart once the Party gained power in Iraq, and in 1966 saw more internal divisions when the 
Syrian wing purged the party of intellectuals, including its founder, Michael Aflaq. Iraqi Ba’ath 
Party members, concerned that Syria would try to invade Iraq to establish a unified state, 
reinstated Aflaq within their own branch of the Party to separate themselves from Syrian 
politics.113 The conceptual inconsistency of having two Pan-Arab groups in the same party that 
were unwilling to work together revealed that, despite lofty theories of unity, these same 
politicians were uninterested in putting such ideals into practice. Despite claims to Pan-Arabism, 
the Iraqi Ba’ath party was by all accounts an Iraqi nationalist one.114 
With regard to promoting a cohesive national identity, Ba’ath Party promoted itself as an 
essential dimension of Iraqi culture and identity in order to keep itself in power and emphasize 
its legitimacy. This politicized identification of party politics with national identity, known as the 
“Ba’athization” of Iraq, lasted for roughly a decade after the party’s establishment in Iraq and 
emphasized that the terms “Ba’athi” and “Iraqi” were one in the same115. During this campaign,  
Ba’ath party members were seen as models of Iraqi nationalism and patriotism.116 Therefore, 
                                               
111
 Bengio, p. 61 
112
 Steavonson, p. 61 
113
 Mackey, p. 211 
114
 Mackey, p. 230 
115
 Bengio, p. 48 
116
 Bengio, p. 89 
Bellini 50
being Iraqi under this regime meant pledging loyalty to the Ba’ath Party above all other loyalties, 
including those to local culture, religion, or ethnic group.117 
Due to the Party’s stress on unity, it officially denounced sectarianism and ethnic tensions 
as relics of colonialism that had no place in independent, modern Arab states.118 In addition, 
tribes were also denounced as backward because they violated the concept of unity by 
emphasizing loyalty to a smaller unit than the nation or the Ba’ath party119. However, there were 
issues within the structure and practices of the Party that contradicted its official stance of 
equality and unity. For example, there were three main factions within the Party, each with 
varying sectarian composition and political ideologies.  Shia citizens largely belonged to the 
leftist wing of the party, and advocated a rapid shift to a socialist state. The rightist group was 
composed of people of mixed religious backgrounds and advocated a more gradual shift to 
socialism with the cooperation of the military and Iraqi nationalists. The third group, headed by 
General al-Bakr, sought to maintain the Sunni stronghold on the nation’s political power 
established in the Mandate Era.120 Therefore, once al-Bakr’s group became more powerful in 
Iraq’s political arena, there was a clear advantage to being Sunni.  
The Ba’ath Party’s policy towards religion and politics remained strictly secular 
throughout the 1970s and made no references to religion in political discourse. This position was 
integral to the Party’s nationalist identity and, in theory, would ensure equality among all 
religious groups in relationship to the state. However, the Ba’ath Party’s methods of enforcing 
this secular identity often had unintended consequences or reflected an undercurrent of prejudice 
towards specific groups. In the 1970s the Party banned Shia religious observances, which led to 
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riots in Najaf and Karbala.121 These actions directly contradicted the Party’s rhetoric about 
equality among citizens and oppressed the rights of a specific religious community, in this case 
towards the Shia majority.  
 
Dimensions of Iraqi Identity under Saddam Hussein  
 
While loyalty to Saddam was characterized as the most vital piece of Iraqi national 
identity throughout his presidency, the dictator also introduced several other critical dimensions 
of this identity, many of which had negative ramifications for Iraq’s various ethnic and religious 
groups. First, Hussein emphasized the Arab dimension of Iraqi identity and deeply mistrusted 
anyone of non-Arab origins. He barred all ethnic Persians from being candidates for high 
government positions, asserting that all candidates must be the offspring of an Iraqi father and an 
Arab mother.122 With this decision, Hussein barred a significant portion of the population that 
was of (partial) Iranian ancestry, even if such people had lived in Iraq for generations, from 
access to a career with his administration. In particular, this affected many Shia citizens: by 
barring non-Arab citizens from being able to run as candidates, Hussein created negative 
consequences for many Shia citizens in Iraq. In theory, this also directly contradicted the Ba’ath 
party rhetoric that sectarianism was an unfortunate relic of colonialism and had no place in 
modern Iraqi society.  
Hussein’s policies towards different and religious groups were often contradictory. 
Although he excluded Iraqis of alleged Iranian origin from full citizenship by denying them 
equal access to the state, he utilized lofty Ba’athi rhetoric of unity towards Iraq’s Kurdish 
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population. In 1979, the dictator stated. “There is no contradiction between the Kurdishness of 
the Kurd and his being part of the Arab nation”.123 He also ethnically linked the Kurds to Arab 
Iraqis through common historical ties dating back to the Assyrians and Babylonians.124 In this 
case, the “Arab” dimension of Iraqi identity was used as a fluid concept to apply to all Iraqis as a 
unifying factor. However, when referring to citizens of Persian origin, ethnicity became a rigid 
and exclusive component of national identity. This inconsistency revealed that Hussein was well 
aware of the power of using group identity as a political tool. In addition, he directly contradicted 
his previous speeches stressing unity between Kurdish and Arab identities and focused on 
ethnicity to marginalize Iraqi Kurds, particularly during the most violent years of the Iran-Iraq 
War in the 1980s. During this same time period, he enforced more exclusionary measures 
towards the Shia population to reflect his strained political relationship with Iran. In alignment 
with these policies, both Shia and Kurds were largely excluded during the government expansion 
throughout the 1980s, despite Hussein’s emphasis on unity in his political speeches.125 
Hussein’s contradictory behavior towards religious and ethnic groups also became 
obvious through political discourse. He stressed that he distrusted those who mixed religion with 
politics, in concordance with the Ba’ath Party’s publically secular identity. In order to stress the 
secular nature of his administration and provide a negative example of mixing religion in politics 
in Iraq’s history, he noted how the Ottomans used their Sunni Muslim identity as a means of 
claiming legitimacy for their rule over Iraq.126 In response to religious parties or those who 
claimed political legitimacy through their religious background, Saddam noted, “By God, I do 
not like them, I do not like those who work politics under the guise of religion. My trust in them 
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is not good.”127 Throughout his rule, Hussein portrayed the Shia majority as religious zealots 
who were a threat to the secular nature of the state and the nation’s identity.  Prior to Hussein’s 
presidency, the Ba’ath Party referred to the Shia community as ta’ifa (community, sect), or 
ta’ifiyya (sectarianism). Originally, these words were use as fairly neutral terms. However, 
during Hussein’s presidency, they became derogatory labels. In speeches he alerted Iraqis that 
they must protect themselves from the threat of the “sectarian infection” that the Shia community 
posed to Iraq.128 In April of 1980 Hussein also executed one of the leading Shia clerics, 
Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr and his sister Bint al-Huda: the incident highlighted his 
paranoia and distrust of the Shia community.129 
 
Political Oppression under Saddam’s Regime 
 
Once Hussein established groups or communities would be included in the concept of an 
Iraqi national identity and which would not, he took various violent measures to intimidate the 
population and enforce his rule. The criminal code under Hussein listed twenty-two crimes as 
punishable by death penalty. For example, Article 225 established the death penalty for anyone 
who insulted Saddam Hussein, the Ba’ath Party, or government leadership.130 Citizens suspected 
of insulting the Ba’ath Party of Saddam often disappeared from their homes in the middle of the 
night or were killed in front of their families, enforcing obedience through the use of fear.131 
Former security officials under the Ba’ath Party have reported that the regime used various 
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torture methods on political prisoners, including rape, beatings, electric shock, cutting off limbs, 
and burning with hot irons.132  
Many Iraqi refugees have come forward to testify their experiences under Saddam 
Hussein’s violent regime. One of these refugees was Mustafa Ali Noman, a teacher in Baghdad, 
who was arrested without charge and imprisoned in Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. There, he was 
subjected to the regime’s violence for fifteen months.133 Noman never learned the reason for his 
arrest and was constantly referred to by the wrong name throughout his time in prison. He 
vividly described his harsh treatment under the regime, including how his family was 
discriminated against for ethnic and religious reasons. For example, he noted that his wife was a 
“nationality”, a term used by the regime during this time to refer to citizens of Iranian ancestry. 
These citizens were often viewed with suspicion and frequently deported in times of political 
upheaval or foreign intervention.134 He also mentioned several colleagues who refused to join the 
Ba’ath Party who were then abducted and executed in prison several months later.135 
 
Saddam’s Political Manipulation of Shia Identity 
 
From September 23rd, 1980 to August 20th, 1988, Iraq was entrenched in a long, costly 
war with Iran that drained both countries of capital, resources and human lives.136 On the surface, 
the main cause of this war was a territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran for the Shatt- al-Arab, 
the straight that forms the border between the two nations.137 However, the deeper roots for this 
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war were found in the political rivalry and power struggle between Saddam Hussein and 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini viewed Hussein as an oppressive dictator, while Hussein felt 
threatened by Khomeini’s takeover of Iran during the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and suspected 
that he would try to invade Iraq. Hussein chose to take an offensive stance in this conflict, and in 
September of 1980, he sent troops to invade Iran, expecting a swift victory.  He was greatly 
mistaken, and both nations became locked in an eight-year war. Iraq suffered roughly 300,000 
casualties, and the government went through great lengths to cover up these figures in a 
desperate attempt to keep its legitimacy. Although all Iraqis suffered as a result of the war, the 
most affected communities were the Kurds and the Shia. Throughout this tumultuous period, 
Hussein portrayed these communities as foreign in order to remove blame from the regime for 
allowing such violence to continue.138  
Hate narratives towards specific ethnic groups became strong political tools used by the 
regime during the Iran-Iraq War to unite the population against a clearly defined enemy. In this 
case, this enemy was constructed to include Iraqi citizens with whom the regime took issue, 
portraying them as part of the same threat to the country that Iran posed. From the beginning of 
the war, Hussein and his regime conceptualized the conflict between Iran and Iraq as an 
inevitable outcome of an ancient struggle between Arabs and Persians. Hussein said the 
following of the Iranian Shia, “The invocation of religion is only a mask to cover Persian racism 
and a buried resentment of the Arab.”139 Therefore, he presented the Iraqi position in the war as 
one of defense against a racist enemy, although in reality it was Hussein who initiated the war 
against Khomeini. Hussein always referred to the enemy with the term “Persia” instead of “Iran” 
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in order to emphasize the ethnic distinction between the two countries and present a clearly 
defined “other” from which Iraq must defend itself.140 
The regime’s portrayal of the Iranian Shia during the Iran-Iraq War had terrible 
consequences for the Iraqi Shia in terms of their interaction with the state. Hussein displayed a 
deep mistrust of Iraq’s own Shia community and portrayed them as part of the foreign Persian 
enemy. Asserting that these citizens would sympathize with Iran, the regime stripped 100,000 to 
500,000 Iraqi Shia of their citizenship in 1980 and deported them to neighboring states, such as 
Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Iraqis who could be connected to Iran by any other means, including 
marriage, also faced death or deportation.141 Those who remained constituted the majority of 
casualties on the front lines throughout the eight-year war.142 Here, the regime introduced new 
policies towards targeted communities within the population; the denial of one’s citizenship and 
deportation. Hussein’s regime was not the first to limit the rights of the Shia community at the 
state level, as was evident from the British decision to label citizens’ Shia status on their 
identification cards under the Mandate. However, this regime placed itself in a contradictory and 
illogical position by denouncing racist actions towards Iraqis as a colonial legacy, and then going 
beyond these same actions by denying the Shia the basic rights of citizenship. Hussein was well 
aware of his country’s colonial past, but was willing to consent to similar racist measures as a 
political tool in order to consolidate his own power during a time of war with a foreign state.  
In addition to constructing an “other group” based on ethnic identity, Hussein’s regime 
also used religion as a tool for exclusion. Here, Hussein completely departed from the Ba’ath 
Party’s secular ideals, the same ideals that he had stressed at the beginning of his own 
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presidency, and utilized the concept of religion as a political tool for his regime. As the war 
progressed and the regime struggled to maintain morale despite devastating losses, this religious 
rhetoric became more common.143 Hussein portrayed the Iranians as enemies of Islam, and so it 
was the duty of Iraqis to defend it, stating, “We have nothing to fear from waging our struggle 
under the precepts of Islam and its benevolent principles.”144 He also stressed that there was no 
contradiction between Arabism, a clearly established component of Iraqi identity, and Islam 
because a true struggle would fuse these identities together.  
 
The Genocide of the Kurds 
 
As Iraqi identity became more exclusively defined through ethnic, political and religious 
terms throughout the Iran-Iraq War, many minority groups were increasingly viewed as the 
“other group”. Unfortunately, during a time of war this meant that Hussein associated them more 
with the Iranian enemy than their fellow Iraqi citizens. This had devastating effects for Iraq’s 
Kurdish population, who had frequently clashed with Iraqi governments and had continuously 
fought for autonomy in predominantly Kurdish regions of the country. From 1987-1989, during 
the most violent years of the Iran-Iraq War, the Kurds were subjected to a state-sanctioned 
genocide, of which the climax was the Anfal Campaign. This organized effort to eliminate the 
Kurds was characterized by the following: widespread use of chemical weapons, including 
mustard gas and nerve agent GB, the destruction of 2,000 villages, mass executions of Kurdish 
men, women and children, and the destruction of the Kurdish economy and infrastructure.145   
During this time, Saddam Hussein became the first president to use chemical weapons against 
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his own population in a display of the worst episode of intolerance and ethnic cleansing in the 
Iraq’s modern history.146 
 Throughout the Anfal Campaign, the regime targeted Kurdish villages in a highly 
organized manner, sending well-equipped troops with deadly weapons and clearly developed 
military strategies. First, the regime labeled Kurdish villages as “prohibited zones” and moved in 
their forces to attack any community living in these areas. Kurdish men, women and children 
were then held in concentration camps or attacked with chemical weapons. Elderly Kurdish 
citizens were sent to a camp called Nuqrat al-Salman, where many of them died due to terrible 
living conditions and were refused a proper burial.147 The largest chemical attack on the Kurds 
was in Halabja, a village on the Iraq-Iran border. On March 16th, 1988, the Iraqi air force 
dropped a mix of mustard gas and nerve agent on the village under the instruction of Ali al-
Majid, causing the immediate death of 3,200 to 5,000 citizens. The survivors were rounded up 
and murdered or placed in concentration camps.148  In reference to rumors surrounding the 
number of Kurds killed during the Anfal campaign, al-Majid responded, “What is this 
exaggerated figure of 182,000? It could not have been more than a hundred thousand!”149 Al-
Majid’s response reveals a complete lack of guilt or urge to cover the murders due to a strong, 
state-sponsored propaganda campaign to dehumanize the Kurdish community.  
Eyewitness accounts from both Kurdish victims and representatives of the regime reveal 
the extent of the violence during the Anfal Campaign as well as its organized, state-sponsored 
nature. Abdallah Abdel-Qadr al-Askari, who survived a chemical attack in the village of 
Guptepe, described the effects of the chemical agents on the villagers: 
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My brothers and my wife had blood and vomit running from their noses and mouths. 
Their heads were tilted to one side. They were groaning. I couldn’t do much, just clean 
the blood and vomit from their mouths and noses and try in every way to make them 
breathe again.150  
 
He then revealed that his family, which once consisted of 40 members, had now dwindled to 15: 
among the dead were his wife and five children.151 
The use of chemical weapons against the Kurds is unique in that the regime became the 
first in modern history to use them against its own citizens. These weapons, while officially 
banned by the international community, were used against Iranian troops during the Iran Iraq 
War. During the Anfal Campaign, Hussein engaged in the unprecedented use of chemical 
weapons against Iraqi civilians as a means of portraying them as part of the enemy, or foreigners 
on Iraqi soil during a time of war who must be removed for the country’s safety.  In this case, the 
use of chemical weapons reveals a complete “othering” of the Kurds and a subsequent violation 
of the most basic human rights. Ali Hassan al-Majid revealed this dehumanization of the Kurds 
in a taped Ba’ath Party meeting in 1987. He described his actions during the genocide as follows: 
We continued the deportations. I told the mustashars152 that they might say that they 
like their villages and that they won’t leave. I said I cannot let your village stay because 
I will attack it with chemical weapons. Then you and your family will die. You must 
leave right now. Because I cannot tell you the same day that I am going to attack with 
chemical weapons. I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say 
anything? The international community? Fuck them! The international community and 
those who listen to them.153 
 
Al-Majid’s comments reveal a cavalier attitude towards the dehumanizing treatment of Kurdish 
citizens that was shared by other members of the government during this time. The result of 
these attitudes towards an already marginalized community resulted in an institutionalized hate 
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narratives about the Kurds that was used to justify the most dehumanizing types of punishment, 
including chemical weapons. 
It is important to note that, while violent interactions between the Iraqi state and the 
Kurdish community had existed before the Anfal Campaign, the largest, most organized violence 
against the Kurds coincided with the height of the violence of the Iran-Iraq War.  Just as the 
Iraqis of alleged or real Persian ancestry had been targets of the regime at the onset of the war, 
the Kurds became an easy scapegoat for, and diversion from, the government’s responsibility for 
the severe loss of human lives during the war. The political discourse engineered by the regime 
during this period reflects its efforts to dehumanize the Kurdish community and therefore justify 
the violence for which it was targeted. The term “Al-Anfal”, literally meaning “the spoils” as in 
the spoils of war, was borrowed from a Sura in the Quran. Hussein wrapped the genocidal 
campaign in this religious rhetoric despite his original claims that Iraq was a secular state, calling 
on the people’s Muslim identity when it was advantageous to the regime. The Sura represents the 
first great battle Muhammad fought at Badr: it is seen as a vindication of faith and a victory due 
to the direct intervention by God.154 By using this label to refer to the Kurdish Genocide, 
Hussein’s regime portrayed this community not only as enemies of the state, but as unbelievers 
and enemies of Islam.155  
Ba’athist officials also employed relatively neutral, official sounding labels by referring 
to their actions as nothing but necessary political measures. They referred to the campaign as 
“collective measures”, “resettlement”, “the Kurdish problem”, and “a return to the national 
ranks”.  Hussein’s cousin Ali Hasan al-Majid who was put in control of the Anfal Campaign, 
referred to this clearly defined “other group” as “the saboteurs”, alluding to an alleged betrayal 
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by the Kurds during the war. Using the label “prohibited villages” instead of “prohibited people” 
made the campaign sound more innocuous, such as when al-Maid banned all human existence in 
certain areas and sanctioned the mass murder of anyone found in these zones. In this context, the 
Kurds were constructed as trespassers on government property and therefore killed for 
committing a crime, not a community that had lived on this soil for centuries. By using these 
labels and by creating propaganda to criminalize the Kurds, the regime was able to publicly 
discuss the genocide without calling attention to the overt, brutal violence that occurred.156  
 
The Invasion of Kuwait and Saddam’s Use of Violence in “Shia” Uprisings 
 
The large-scale, organized violence against the Kurds continued until the Iran-Iraq War, 
which lasted eight years, ended in a stalemate. In sum, Iraq had suffered thousands of casualties, 
$452.6 billion in material losses, and it found itself deeply in debt to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.157 
The foreign debt reached $80 billion, twice that of Iraq’s GNP.158 Following the devastating 
effects of the war, many citizens were coerced into submission to the state’s perception of 
national identity in order to avoid further violence and fragmentation. This consent to Hussein’s 
rule does not mean that Iraqis supported his policies, but that they wanted to reestablish a stable 
daily life in Iraq and feared that a change in regime would compromise this stability.159 Despite 
his desire for stability, Hussein’s personal ambitions to be represented as an Arab hero, massive 
debt and political stress caused him to engage in violence against yet another neighboring state 
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by invading Kuwait.160 On August 2nd, 1990, Hussein deployed 100,000 Iraqi troops and 
subdued Kuwait’s small army of 20,000 men within 7 hours, placing Kuwait under Iraqi 
occupation.161 The decision to invade this tiny nation, while fueled by hopes of restoring Iraq’s 
reputation and finances, would have devastating effects on Iraq’s Shia population and served as a 
turning point relations between the state and its citizens in Iraq.  
In order to legitimize the invasion of Kuwait amidst its unpopularity among Arab 
countries and the wider international community, Hussein employed the same contradictory 
rhetoric relating to Iraq’s colonial past that he had used at the beginning of his presidency. First, 
he blamed British colonialism for separating Kuwait from Iraq by drawing the country’s artificial 
borders: Kuwait had been considered part of the southern province of Basra under Ottoman 
rule.162  He then presented his invasion of Kuwait as a means of undoing these wrongs that the 
British had imposed on Iraq during the colonial era. He stressed: “Colonialism divested it [Iraq] 
of a dear part of it, namely Kuwait, and kept Iraq from the waters to prevent it from acquiring 
part of its tactical and strategic abilities and thus kept part of its people and part of its wealth 
away from the origin and the well spring.”163 He further argued that Kuwait would be “weak, 
small, and lacking cultural depth” as long as it was separated from Iraq. In order to further 
promote his unpopular political agenda, Hussein began a policy of “Iraqizaton” of Kuwait. This 
policy was meant to bolster a feeling of Iraqi national identity within his own country while 
trying to impose this identity on Kuwait.164 By criticizing the political actions made by the 
British during the Mandate period, Hussein tried to rally Iraqis citizens in correcting these 
actions by taking back Kuwait to be part of Iraq. In reality, by engaging in this nationalist 
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campaign and invading Kuwait, Hussein transformed Iraq into the very sort of colonizer he 
sought to delegitimize.   
Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait was met with swift action by the international 
community. First, the United Nations attempted to undermine Saddam Hussein’s power by 
weakening Iraq’s economy. In August of 1990, the UN attempted to curb the regime’s power by 
imposing a global trade embargo on Iraq.165 While this tactic enraged Hussein and caused the 
Iraqi people to suffer, it did not end the occupation of Kuwait. In response to Hussein’s failure to 
respond to the actions of the international community, the United States and its allies decided to 
take direct military action to end the occupation. In January 1991, the US invaded Iraq, citing 
that it sought to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein’s forces.166   
In addition to taking military action, the US also encouraged Iraqi citizens, who were 
angered by the regime’s oppression and excessive use of violence, to overthrow the dictator and 
allow for a more democratic regime in Iraq. On February 15th, 1991 George H.W. Bush 
addressed the Iraqi people with the following: “There’s another way for the bloodshed to stop, 
and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands to force 
Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”167 The Iraqi population, assuming that the United 
States would therefore use its military presence in Iraq to help their cause, rose up against 
Saddam and attempted to overthrow his regime. In March 1991, citizens in Basra and then later 
in Mosul rose up against Hussein’s forces, shouting anti-regime slogans and attacking members 
of the Ba’ath Party in protest.168 Within days, the revolts had spread to nearly every major city in 
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Iraq, including Karbala, Najaf, Hilla and Kut.169 They were crushed by Saddam’s forces, and 
received no aid from the US military. Instead, thousands of Iraqis in Basra were killed, and two 
million were forced to leave their home to escape the violence.170 Many Iraqis viewed the United 
States’ passivity in the face of such atrocities against civilians as a betrayal, which damaged the 
relationship between the two countries. 
The regime’s reaction to the uprisings, which eventually involved more than 15,000 
civilians, took the form of Hussein’s familiar strategy of accusing traditionally marginalized 
communities of aligning themselves with foreign powers to bring down the regime in order to 
deflect any legitimate, wide-spread negative sentiments against the regime. This strategy is found 
even in the simple labeling of the uprisings as “The Shia Uprisings” to isolate and attack the Shia 
population and present the revolts as a product of foreign conspiracy. The fact that the revolts 
began in Basra was also logical given its close proximity to the violence caused by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Citizens more directly exposed to the violence would have more incentive to 
rise up against the regime than those who were more removed from the everyday reality of these 
military ventures.171 Soon, however, the revolts spread throughout the country in response to 
popular discontent with the regime. Throughout the government response to the uprisings in 
Basra and later in Mosul, Hussein carefully portrayed these events through an ethno-religious 
lens in order to delegitimize the protestor’s grievances and to detract from the reality that these 
were not Kurdish and Shia uprisings, but civilian uprisings representing large portions of Iraqi 
society against a corrupt and violent regime.    
The manner in which Hussein’s regime attacked protestors in the cities of Najaf and 
Karbala demonstrated its efforts to delegitimize these revolts by presenting them as a foreign 
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conspiracy involving Iraqi Shia. The regime targeted Shia shrines with shelling, resulting in the 
complete demolition of many holy sites in both cities. For example, in Najaf, government forces 
targeted the Wadi al-Salaam cemetery, where Shia pilgrims from all over the world lie buried. 
They also targeted and destroyed many religious libraries containing ancient manuscripts.172 In 
addition, the regime  targeted relatives, friends and students of Ayatollah al-Khoi, many of 
whom disappeared during the uprisings.173 The specific targeting of Shia religious sites and 
ayatollahs was engineered in order to associate the civilian violence with a Shia religious motive 
or purpose. Overall, the targeting of Iraqi Shia communities was part of Hussein’s larger strategy 
of divide and rule while his regime was experiencing large-scale revolts that challenged his 
authority. 
Interviews with Iraqi Shia refugees in neighboring Turkey, Syria and Iran revealed the 
extent of the violence toward unarmed citizens during the uprisings. One businessman recalled 
returning to a house after Saddam’s loyalists had attacked his town. He recalled:  
In the living room, there were the bodies of two young girls, completely naked, hung 
from the fan that was suspended from the ceiling...In another room was the rest of the 
family- eight bodies, including a child under the age of two. I saw whole families cut to 
pieces- arms, hands legs.174 
 
Other refugees also noted the excessive amount of violence targeted towards women and 
children: Republican Guards targeted them during the uprisings and tied them to tanks to use 
them as human shields against the rebels as a way of demeaning the Shia population.175  A 
resident of Najaf, in his interview in Qom (Iran) on March 17th also reported that the regime 
targeted women and children. He stated: 
                                               
172
 Middle East Watch, p. 27 
173
 Middle East Watch, p. 28 
174
 Middle East Watch, p. 46 
175
 Middle East Watch, p. 46 
Bellini 66
People were told on the loudspeakers to evacuate the city within 24 hours for their own 
safety and head north, in the direction of Karbala. When thousands of people had 
gathered in the northern outskirts of the city-it was afternoon already, around 3 o’clock, 
and they were mostly women and children- helicopters opened fire from machine guns 
at them. Between 250 and 300 people were killed.176  
 
Other reports revealed a variety of other instances of targeted violence against civilians, 
including arbitrary arrests, torture and murder by tying civilians to large stones and throwing 
them into the Shatt al-Arab.177 Overall, eyewitness accounts all largely condemned the regime 
for gross violations of human rights, most notably against the civilians of Basra.  
Political discourse used during the Gulf War and the uprisings in Basra, in conjunction 
with state-sponsored violence, served to delegitimize the Iraqi population’s grievances against 
the regime by painting the Shia community as criminals aligned with Iran. One of the most 
obvious forms this discourse took was the labeling of these revolts as the “Shia uprisings”. As 
the region closest to, and most affected by the violence in Kuwait, it is logical that 
demonstrations against the regime and the associated violence would break out in Basra. While 
the majority of the population of Basra was Shia, this does not mean that the population rose up 
against the regime because of their religious background. The label of “Shia uprisings” was a 
direct over simplification of the uprising popularized by the regime in order to portray the Shia 
as enemies of Iraq and therefore deserving of whatever violence they were subjected to by the 
regime. This strategy also further divided Iraqi society across sectarian lines by making even 
non-practicing Shia feel a need to defend this aspect of their identity as it had come under violent 
attack by the regime.178 
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Hussein’s regime engineered various other terms to portray the Shia community as 
criminal and a direct threat to Iraqi identity as a whole during what was portrayed as the Shia 
uprising. Interviews with Shia citizens reveal common attitudes during this time that Sunni 
citizens represented the regime and Iraq as a whole, while the Shia did not.179 Assuming that all 
citizens viewed themselves through a sectarian lens and seeking to reinforce this perspective, the 
regime discredited the Shia by referring to them as “shu’ubi” or “taifi” (sectarian) in Iraqi 
political discourse. These labels carried a heavy stigma of being an internal enemy and direct 
threat to the unity of the state: they were previously used to refer to all opposition groups, such 
as the communist party, but became reserved for the Shia as the violence of the uprisings 
escalated.180 One of the most devastating effects of these state-sponsored hate narratives against 
Shia was a shift in relationships not only between the Shia community and the state, but among 
civilians as well. An interviewee from Nassiriya remarked on this shift in attitudes in Iraqi 
society: 
In the 1990’s the question of, ‘Are you Sunni or Shi’a?’ became more common. The 
Shi’a didn’t always say they were Shi’a. A lot of [Shi’a] families, when you ask them 
if they are Shi’a or Sunni avoid the question. But the Sunni will say he is Sunni 
directly. Why? The reason is that ‘Sunni’ is Saddam’s regime and ‘Shi’a’ isn’t.181 
 
   This increased popular focus on religious identity of other Iraqis shows the destructive 
effects of the regime’s treatment towards the Shia in terms of communal relations. The original 
source of the uprisings in Basra was one of protest to the government’s invasion of Kuwait and 
the subsequent violence that ensued. However, once the regime began to attack the Shia religious 
identity through derogatory labels during episodes of violence, these identities became more 
                                               
179
 Haddad, p. 49 
180
 Haddad, p. 44 
181
 Haddad, p. 49 
Bellini 68
hardened as a means of defensive action. This hardening of identities left a lasting impression on 




Saddam Hussein’s 24-year rule over Iraq provides valuable insight into the development 
of state-sponsored violence as a tool for enforcing national identity, and in the changes in 
communal relations in Iraq as a whole. These changes are particularly palpable during times of 
political upheaval and foreign intervention, such as the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. Despite 
criticizing many of the racist policies of the Mandate era that marginalized entire communities in 
Iraq and prevented from enjoying the same status with relation to the state as the Sunni 
aristocracy, Hussein’s regime built upon, rather than abandoned, these political strategies in 
practice in order to hold on to power. The first stage in developing violence as a political tool 
was the regime’s treatment of Iraqis who did not politically identify with the Ba’ath Party 
following Hussein's rise to power. At the start of his presidency in 1979, Hussein aligned his 
ideals and the ideals of the Ba’ath Party with Iraqi identity and subjected any political rivals, real 
or alleged, to arbitrary arrest, torture, and death. This treatment of political prisoners introduced 
the use of violence to reinforce the state-sanctioned version of national identity as a commonly 
used political tool of the state. Hussein further promoted fear and large-scale violence as a 
political tool against specific communities in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). During 
the Anfal Campaign as well as the uprisings in Basra, Iraqi citizens were subjected to violations 
of human rights and hate narratives designed to associate them with foreign powers and deny 
their rights as Iraqi citizens. While British officials were largely responsible for introducing 
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differential access to the state in modern Iraq as a political practice, Hussein’s actions during his 
presidency shows Iraqi agency in exploiting this existing practice for political power. 
 This historical period presents an alarming trend in the relations not only between the 
citizens and the state, but also among citizens of differing ethno-religious backgrounds. Despite a 
foreign occupation and a regime change under the Mandate Era, society was not fragmented 
along ethno-sectarian lines or experience episodes of large-scale violence among these groups. 
Under Hussein’s Ba’ath Party however, particularly during the Gulf War, the question of 
whether citizens described themselves as Sunni or Shia, which according to many in Iraqi society 
was never asked prior to this time period, became more common. While the state violence 
towards the Shia and during Hussein’s regime certainly further institutionalized ethno-religious 
violence from the state to marginalized groups of civilians, the absence of inter-civilian violence 
as seen in modern-day Iraq reveals that an additional catalyst was needed in order to catapult to 




















 Throughout the 1990s following the end of the Gulf War, Iraqi citizens suffered greatly 
under the sanctions and political isolation imposed by the international community designed to 
weaken Saddam Hussein’s regime. By the time of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
country had been substantially weakened, but the government still managed to remain in control 
until it was toppled by American troops.182 This invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq 
remains puzzling in terms of true causes and motives. According to the supporters in Washington 
at the time of the invasion, military efforts in Iraq were justified for two main reasons. First, 
neoconservatives in the United States sought to promote democracy in the region through 
military efforts while fighting members of al-Qaeda in response to the attacks on the World 
Trade Center on September 11th, 2001.183 In addition, President George W. Bush and members 
of his administration defended their invasion of Iraq by accusing Saddam Hussein of possessing 
weapons of mass destruction. However, these alleged weapons were never found. Without a 
clearly defined set of objectives or exit strategy, both the United States and Iraq were caught in a 
war that cost roughly 3,000 American lives, 20,000 Americans wounded, as many as 600,000 
Iraqi civilian lives, and forced 3 million Iraqis to flee to neighboring countries.184 Quality of life 
in Iraq also diminished due to restricted access to clean drinking water, sewage treatments, and 
electricity.185 In addition, diverse communities in Iraq that had once peacefully coexisted, even in 
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the midst of state-sponsored violence against specific religious and ethnic violence, became 
immersed in sectarian violence.186 
 This chapter will focus on the impact of the new Iraqi Coalition government on 
communal identity in Iraq. This new administration was developed and run by both American 
and Iraqi political entrepreneurs, and therefore both parties share some responsibility in the 
contribution to the fragmentation of Iraqi society during this time period. The United States 
government made the controversial decisions to invade Iraq and to dismantle its ruling 
administration without the support of the international community. By removing the country’s 
only apparatus capable of maintaining stability and law and order in Iraq society, the U.S. 
administration became responsible for fulfilling this role by constructing a new state agency able 
to meet these requirements, and it failed to do so. A variety of factors, including insufficient 
American security forces after the fall of Baghdad, the process of de-Ba’athification, the decision 
to disband the Iraqi army, and the inability to imagine a new Iraqi administration not grounded in 
sectarian politics all contributed to the rise in insurgency and the collapse of the Iraqi state.187 In 
addition to these failures for which the United States must claim responsibility, one cannot 
ignore Iraqi agency in the rise of communal violence during this period. In the wake of the power 
vacuum left by Hussein’s overthrow, communities began to fight one another in hopes of gaining 
the favor of U.S. forces and getting a larger share of power in the new administration. What 
began as a fear of being marginalized once again on the grounds of identity developed into a 
system of violent identity politics both in the form of government corruption and the rise of 
ethnic and sectarian militias. 
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Background to the American Invasion of Iraq in 2003 
 
 Before identifying the errors made by American policy makers and U.S.-led Coalition 
forces during the occupation, it is important to take into account their perspective on the situation 
in Iraqi prior to the invasion. The inability to accurately understand the state of affairs in Iraq 
under Saddam Hussein and to present to both Iraqis and the international community clear, 
logical reasons to justify the military intervention had an effect on the operation’s success 
because it altered Iraqi citizens’ perception of this occupation’s legitimacy. As previously stated, 
the primary reasons given by the Bush Administration to justify this invasion were the following; 
an act of defense against global terrorism following the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon on September 11th, 2001, and a necessary move to obtain and destroy weapons of 
mass destruction supposedly in Hussein’s possession.188 Prior to the occupation, neither the 
majority of Iraqis nor the larger international community aimed to defend Saddam Hussein, a 
despotic ruler who had subjected his citizens to gross violations of human rights.189 However, 
accusations that Hussein was somehow linked to the attacks of 9/11 or to groups such as al-
Qaeda were conceptually problematic. While undeniably cruel, the dictator was by all accounts a 
secular Ba’athist ruler and had no common interests or goals, ideological or otherwise, with 
militant jihadists. In addition, there was no evidence for this supposed collusion between 
Ba’athists and members of Al-Qaeda.190 For many in Iraq and in the eyes of the greater 
international community, neither of these reasons justified the invasion.191  
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In response to these criticisms, George Bush and other members of his administration 
released statements calling the invasion of Iraq a humanitarian intervention designed to protect 
Iraqis from human rights violations under a despotic regime.192 As documented in Chapter Two, 
there is a great deal of documentation, including testimonies from eyewitnesses, to support the 
claim that Hussein committed gross violations of human rights against his own citizens prior to 
the invasion in 2003. If the U.S. administration sought to enter Iraq on the grounds of 
humanitarian intervention, it could have done so during the Kurdish Genocide in 1988 or during 
the uprisings against the regime in 1991. However, as seen in Chapter Two, US forces were 
reluctant to intervene for humanitarian reasons during this time and instead encouraged Iraqi 
citizens to overthrow Saddam Hussein themselves.193 Because its political leadership had already 
damaged its reputation with the Iraqi people in the past, the U.S. diminished the likelihood that 
Iraqi citizens would trust the Coalition’s motives during the 2003 occupation. 
 
The U.S.-led Coalition’s Invasion of Iraq and the Downfall of Saddam Hussein 
 
 The United States military’s actions during the initial stages of the invasion of Iraq had 
tremendous ramifications for the future success of the occupation. Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
name given for the U.S. occupation of Iraq, began on March 20th, 2003.194 Baghdad fell on April 
9th, bringing an end to Hussein’s 24-year rule.195 Some of the first major issues to arise after the 
fall of Baghdad were the violence, looting, and overall lawlessness in the absence of sufficient 
security forces made available by the occupying army. These factors, uncontrolled by U.S. 
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troops, undermined the initial Iraqi support of U.S. troops and contributed to the communal 
violence that ensued. Mark Kukis, a reporter for Time Magazine, interviewed over 100 Iraqis 
from a variety of backgrounds in order to construct a people’s history of a tumultuous era in Iraq. 
Interviewees, such as Mohammad Khalil Hamid, provided the international community with 
personal accounts of the chaos in Baghdad following the U.S. invasion. Hamid, who worked as a 
colonel in the Republican Guard, revealed his own experiences during an interview with Kukis. 
As a government official, Hamid had enjoyed a stable home and family before the fall of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Like many other Iraqis, Hamid’s daily life was deeply impacted by 
the chaos and lawlessness that followed the American invasion of Baghdad. In order to 
document this turbulent period of the nation’s history, he said in an interview with Kukis:  
Man, my neighborhood was a disaster scene when I got there. The wreckage of 
destroyed tanks and artillery pieces was strewn everywhere. Bombed-out buildings 
were still on fire. Bodies were rotting in the road. The only signs of life to be seen were 
the warplanes in the skies and the U.S. soldiers roaming the streets. I felt so helpless 
when I looked at them, these occupiers. The Kuwaitis looked at us the same way when 
we invaded, and they had the right. Now I knew how they felt.196 
 
 Hamid’s account of Baghdad in 2003 allows for two insights. First, the lack of efficient 
security forces, particularly in civilian areas, disrupted everyday life and led to the collapse of 
law and order. This breakdown rendered citizens like Hamid eventually unable to support their 
families due to the lack of stable jobs. Secondly, Hamid’s account shows that Iraqis viewed the 
Americans as occupiers. This view of American troops removed their legitimacy and decreased 
the likelihood of success for any type of administration supported by these forces. In addition, 
the American troops’ inability to control the looting and chaos following the fall of Hussein’s 
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regime decreased Iraqis’ overall confidence in their ability to effectively rebuild the state, 
contributing to the rise of local militias.197  
 
Establishing Military Rule and De-Ba’athification 
 
 Due to the instability and overall lawlessness following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, one of the top priorities for the American troops following the invasion was to install a 
new administration, which, if executed effectively, would promote greater stability throughout 
the country. Following the removal of the dictator, President George W. Bush placed retired 
military general Jay Garner in charge of organizing elections, which he wanted to be held as 
early as possible in order to let Iraqis have a voice in the decision-making process for the new 
administration. In addition, he also wanted to involve the Iraqi population in deciding how to 
distribute the country’s assets, such as oil refineries.198 However, in May 2003, Bush  replaced 
Garner with Paul Bremer, a retired diplomat with close ties to the Republican Party, who sought 
to distribute Iraq’s assets privately and delay elections until a later, unspecified date.199 Bremer 
and his colleagues then initiated an aggressive process of de-Ba’athification, in which all former 
members of the Ba’ath Party, without exception, were barred from participating in Iraq’s new 
government.  In addition to this controversial de-Ba’athification process, Bremer also made the 
decision to dismantle the Iraqi army.200 On May 16th, 2003, roughly 50,000 Ba’ath Party 
members were fired from their positions and barred from participating in the new administration. 
                                               
197
 Williams, Phil. "Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq." Prism 1 (2009): 47-68. P. 54 
198
 Ahmed, p. 25 
199
 Ahmed, p. 25 
200
 Williams, p. 54 
Bellini 77
When the Iraqi army was disbanded, over 500,000 young armed men were removed from their 
posts and left with no means of earning an income.201 
The decision to remove former Ba’ath Party members, while understandable in terms of 
trying to prevent former officials who had engaged in violations of human rights from inflicting 
further harm on Iraqi citizens, had several negative consequences for Iraq. For example, many 
U.S. officials overstepped their initial orders of only removing members from the top tiers of the 
party by firing the great majority of its members. Some Iraqis also took advantage of such 
policies and used them to eliminate political rivals.202 This move left ordinary Iraqis, many of 
whom had been coerced or intimidated into joining the Ba’ath Party, from having legitimate 
careers in government. In addition, the rejection of educated Iraqi citizens with an in-depth 
knowledge of government left the country with a power and skill vacuum, for few citizens were 
equipped to fill the void in such a short span of time.203 Peter Galbraith, former United States 
diplomat, expressed his concern about this sweeping policy as follows: “While intending to weed 
out the truly evil, he (Bremer) inadvertently fired people who joined only for careerist reasons, 
including doctors, teachers and the like”.204  
Like de-Ba’athification, the decision to dismantle the existing Iraqi army also had long-
term negative consequences that contributed to Iraq’s instability. The U.S. army was unable to 
control the violence and looting on its own, but fired the only other establishment that had the 
training and resources to help maintain law and order. In sum, controversial policies such as de-
Ba’athification and the disbandment of the Iraqi army not only prevented an entire class of Iraqis 
from participating in the rebuilding of Iraq, but they also deprived hundreds of thousands of Iraqi 
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families of their livelihoods. Denied a means of earning their livelihood, excluded from taking 
part in their government, and humiliated by the occupation of their country, former Ba’ath Party 
members and army officials were left with few alternatives than to join militias, which then 
contributed to the rise in political violence.205  
 
Constructing a New Iraqi Administration 
 
After establishing who would be excluded, Bremer and other members of the US 
Coalition began the process of choosing qualified members for the new Iraqi government. In 
June 2004, the Coalition handpicked  Iyad Allawi and other former Iraqi exiles, most of whom 
already had a close relationship with American forces and had lived outside of Iraq for many 
years.206 The Iraqi administration was left little power over minor administrative decisions, over 
which Bremer still maintained veto power.207 
Iyad Allawi, a politician of a secular Shia background with a strong relationship with the 
US, served as the interim Prime Minister from 2004 to 2005.208 Allawi had briefly been a 
member of the Ba’ath Party in the 1970’s before he had become involved in dissident politics. 
He plotted against Saddam Hussein and was eventually forced into exile after he had survived 
several assassination attempts.209 In an interview with Time Magazine, Allawi shared his 
perspective on the occupation and what it meant for the future of his country. He explained that, 
despite the anger at another foreign occupation, he and other Iraqis remained hopeful to rebuild 
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their country after years of sanctions and unjust rule under Saddam Hussein. However, once he 
was placed in the position of Prime Minister, he was shocked and frustrated about how poorly 
the US was prepared to rebuild an entirely new government in Iraq.210 He expressed criticism of 
the lack of American responsiveness to Iraqi advice and proposals for Iraqi suggestions as 
follows:  
Experts from the Iraqi opposition and experts from the United States and Britain had sat 
down and discussed virtually all aspects of a transition. Piles and piles of reports were 
written, all to be tucked away and forgotten in cellars around Washington when the 
Pentagon was given the authority to run the country as they saw fit. And clearly they had 
no idea what to do.211 
 
With considerable influence from Washington, Allawi continued the task of forming his 
cabinet. He chose thirty-three members and tried to represent Iraq’s diverse social fabric by 
including people from a variety of ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. For example, he 
assigned seven seats to Kurds in proportion to their numbers in the population.212 This quota 
system, while intended to prevent marginalization of ethnic and religious minorities, had 
negative consequences for communal relations in Iraqi society. By introducing a system of 
fixed political representation based on one’s background, the new Iraqi administration 
effectively reduced all the diverse political perspectives in Iraq to a game of identity politics, in 
which Iraqi political opportunists vied for power by fighting against fellow citizens and looking 
out only for the interests of their ethnic or religious communities. In time, these powerful 
politicizations of identities were combined with the violent tactics of sectarian militia groups 
and gave rise to sectarian warfare. 
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After establishing his cabinet, Allawi arranged to hold a trial for Saddam Hussein to hold 
him accountable for his many violations of human rights throughout his twenty-four year rule. 
Hussein was accused of twelve crimes against humanity, including executing political 
dissidents and Islamic leaders, and using chemical weapons against the Kurds during the Anfal 
Campaign.213 On November 5th, 2006 after being tried and found guilty of these charges, 
Hussein was sentenced to death by hanging.214  
 
Iraq’s First Democratic Elections of 2005: Successes, Failures, and Consequences 
 
In spite of the political fragmentation of the new Iraqi government, Allawi and his 
cabinet still faced the task of running the country’s first national elections since the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein. In order to help achieve this goal, the Coalition hired Algerian Lakhdar 
Brahimi to help evaluate Iraq’s security situation before the elections, which were scheduled to 
take placed in January 2005. His appointment caused a dispute among Iraqis from all parts of 
society because he was a former supporter of Saddam Hussein.215 During his time in the Arab 
League, he had denied that Hussein ever used chemical weapons against the Kurds, and had 
insisted that the dictator was the pride of the Arab people.216 Therefore, his appointment 
reflected the Coalition’s persistent lack of knowledge of Iraq’s history and dismissal of the 
desires of the Iraqi people.  
After Brahimi had determined Iraq’s security to be stable, the government proceeded 
with the elections. The results showed the extent of inequality and political fragmentation that 
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developed since 2003. While Shia and Kurdish communities had taken part in the election in 
great numbers and thus became well represented in the government, many Sunnis had been 
excluded by the new government through measures such as de-Ba’athification and lacked 
political voice. The United Iraqi Alliance, composed of a variety of Shia political parties, won 
48% of the vote; the Kurdistani Alliance won 14%, and the remainder of Sunni or secular 
parties received the remaining votes.217 The Coalition was particularly disappointed by the very 
few votes won by Allawi’s secular party. As a result, Shia Iraqis controlled 138 of the 275 
parliament seats.218 Despite many appeals, over 500 secular political candidates were banned 
from the political process due to alleged associations with the Ba’ath Party. Their appeals were 
denied without appropriate investigations, thus disenfranchising an educated group of Iraqis 
from engaging in the new political system.219 One of the most troubling aspects of the election 
results was the stark political fragmentation evident in the lack of voting participation in Sunni 
neighborhoods. Due to widespread boycotts in these areas, Sunni parties and politicians were 
severely underrepresented in the government. In addition, many accused the interim 
government of rigging the elections in order to decrease Sunni representation, although no 
evidence was found by the Coalition to support this claim.220  
Amidst the widespread frustration over the election results, tensions rose among Shia 
and Sunni communities and were reflected in increasingly hostile political discourse. Many 
Sunni citizens, angered at their own marginalization in the elections, began to view all Shia 
Iraqis as their enemy and referred to them as “Iranians”.221 In response, Sunni citizens were 
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referred to as Ba’athists and Wahabis222. All of these derogatory terms were designed to 
associate a large portion of Iraqis with a foreign country or corrupt regime, thereby removing 
their legitimacy and right to participation in the government.223 Overall, many Iraqis were not 
content with the formation of parties and voting so closely associated with ethnic or sectarian 
identity and felt that it belittled the actual content or specific political view of each party, but it 
proved to be a powerful tool for  political opportunists mobilizing militias.  The decision to 
form political parties to represent the various religious and ethnic communities in Iraq, while 
meant to prevent marginalization of minorities, reduced the political process to voting along 
sectarian group identities out of fear of losing political voice.224 This system of power sharing 
based almost exclusively on political sectarian identity over national identity caused 
competition and tensions among diverse groups of Iraq’s society. It resembled the problematic 
voting system of other countries such as Lebanon where it has also caused communal 
conflict.225 Despite efforts to execute free and fair elections, Coalition forces made several key 
errors, including banning a huge secular population from running as political candidates and 
not responding to the boycotts in predominantly Sunni neighborhoods,  thus enabling Shia 
parties to dominate the political arena with little representation from other factions of Iraqi 
society.226 
 
Escalating Sectarian Tensions in the Iraqi Government 
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While the United States introduced divisive policies such as the quota system based on 
religious and ethnic identity into the new Iraqi administration, the corruption of government-
run establishments and the marginalization of specific communal that resulted reveals active 
Iraqi agency in the fragmentation of Iraq along sectarian lines. For example, branches of 
government that had been dominated by Sunni elites for decades were now experiencing a shift 
in the balance of power, causing communal tensions both inside and outside the workplace, and 
threatened to prevent the government from effectively functioning. Azhar Abdul-Karim Abdul-
Wahab, a professor during this time period, shared her observations of communal tensions in 
the workplace with reporters as follows:  
I’m a Sunni and my husband, who was also a professor at the university, is a Shi’ite. A 
lot of Sunni staff members simply could not accept what was clearly happening- that is, 
the rise in the power of the Shi’ites. They could never accept the idea of an Iraq 
dominated by Shi’ites. Even though I am a Sunni I took another view. The Shi’ites and 
the Kurds had suffered a lot under the previous regime. Why should they not have a 
chance to run the country? That view caused me a lot of problems with my colleagues at 
work and even my close family.227 
 
 Azhar’s observations demonstrate that, despite recent developments in government-
controlled establishments such as the education system to challenge the status quo and 
incorporate more diversity, social tensions were escalating just beneath the surface. Her point 
of view does not represent entire Shia or Sunni communities in Iraq as they do not constitute 
monolithic groups, but rather it shows prejudices and assumptions at play during this time 
period. According to Azhar, many Sunnis, particularly those who had been labeled as ex-
Ba’athists and had been prevented from taking part in Iraq’s new administration, felt alienated 
and resented  Shia and Kurdish citizens for assuming the positions they had once occupied. In 
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the power vacuum left by the U.S.-led Coalition’s exclusion of Sunni citizens from these 
government posts, members of the Shia and Kurdish communities were able to fill these 
vacancies. This particular viewpoint showcases how existing assumptions regarding Iraqis of 
different ethnic or religious backgrounds, while not necessarily harmful in isolation, became 
more problematic and even potentially violent when they were politicized by the existing 
administration. Azhar herself notes that not all Sunnis harbored such resentments or felt 
threatened by the increase in the rights of Shia and Kurds, who had suffered greatly under the 
previous regime.  
 Heightening tensions in other branches of government caused the fragmentation of 
these establishments across sectarian lines and prevented its officials from working together 
in an effective and productive manner. Abu Mustapha, an official of the Iraqi Department of 
Agriculture, was able secure his job after the US invasion in 2003.228 In his interview, he 
documented the changes he observed in his everyday work environment .229 First, he noticed 
the images of Shia icons and clerics being posted around the office.230 He observed: 
Gradually people claiming to be doing the bidding of Shi’ite religious authorities began 
to fill the posts left open by the vanished Ba’athists. People known to be thieves or 
petents, even illiterates, were suddenly running important offices, and they began 
verbally abusing and firing Sunnis or anyone they distrusted. More than two-dozen 
senior officials who had been important to the ministry’s work were kicked out by 
these new bosses. These were the ministry’s  technocrats, scientific men who didn’t 
have any sectarian leanings to speak of.231 
 
 Mustapha’s observations exposed the infiltration of various government branches by 
sectarian-leaning militants, many of whom were granted these positions as personal favors 
from those in power. As the violence escalated, many weapons used in communal violence 
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throughout the country were traced back to these ministries.232 In response to these new 
changes, Sunnis in the Ministry of Agriculture began to move their offices to one hallway, 
and the Shia to another. Mustapha insisted that he had never seen this self-segregation and 
inability to efficiently work with citizens of a different religious or ethnic background before 
the U.S. invasion.233 Such tensions, as seen in these professional spaces, revealed a deeply 
fragmented political system in which officials were unable to perform daily functions and 
which was easily exploited by radical militants. The observations of these various 
government agencies show that, despite efforts to rebuild a new unified Iraqi administration 
and society, religious and ethnic divisions became deeply rooted into this political system 
almost as quickly as it was formed.  
 
The Rise of Sectarian Militias in Iraq 
 
 One of the greatest shortcomings of the Coalition forces and the new Iraqi-run 
government was the failure to control the rise of insurgent groups, either by providing 
sufficient security forces or allowing members of the Iraqi army to work with the Coalition. 
This eventually caused Iraq to become engulfed in full-scale sectarian violence. While there 
were attacks by suicide bombers as early as the US invasion in 2003, militias became more 
active and  violent throughout the occupation, with violent insurgent activity peaking in 2006-
2007.234 During this period, daily life was completely disrupted by violence, with Baghdad 
witnessing 10-15 bombings per day.235 Militias of varying religious and ethnic backgrounds 
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targeted Americans and Iraqi citizens, which had devastating consequences for communal 
relations and state building. Many Iraqis who tried to become involved in the National Iraqi 
Accord were targeted by insurgent groups, making it difficult for them to have a safe and 
successful livelihoods.236 Rendering the government largely obsolete in terms of efficiently 
maintaining Iraq’s safety and stability, these militias took advantage of this power vacuum 
and sought to control the fragmented country through organized crime and sectarian violence. 
Through government corruption, kidnapping, and violence towards civilians, these militias 
became a powerful force in Iraq, almost serving as a proxy state in light of the failures of the 
new administration. In sum, they are clear evidence of the extent of Iraqi agency in 
contributing to the disintegration of the political system as well as communal relations.237 
 
The Establishment of Shia Militias 
 
 Soon after the establishment of this deeply flawed political system, both Sunni and Shia 
Iraqis began to organize  militia groups whose leaders filled the power vacuum left by an 
inefficient Iraqi state entity. Shia political factions include the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) led by Abdul al-Hakim, al Dawa led by al-Maliki, and the Sadr 
movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr.238 Many of these militia members also held official positions 
in the new government, which allowed them to gain access to valuable intelligence and weapons 
to engage in ethnic cleansing campaigns.239 Armed with foreign aid from Iran and other nations, 
weapons, and a means of manipulating government resources for their own agenda, these militias 
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proved to be a dangerous force, both in terms of destabilizing the fragile administration and 
engaging in sectarian violence against their fellow Iraqi citizens. 
 One of the most prominent Shia militia groups was the Badr Brigade, which had been 
formed in 1982 during the Iran-Iraq War.240 This militia was established as the militarized wing 
of the SCIRI, or the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the most popular political 
party in Iraq composed primarily of Shia citizens.241 Many of its members were driven 
underground or to Iran during Saddam Hussein’s rule, but reemerged in Iraq upon the US 
occupation. Badr Brigade members became known for disguising themselves in official 
government uniforms and then carrying out acts of large-scale acts of violence against civilians 
in predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq. While they targeted entire Sunni civilian neighborhoods 
with violence, Badr Brigade members also used their forces to protect Shia areas from al-Qaeda 
and other Sunni insurgent groups.242 Many Iraqis viewed this group with suspicion, not only for 
their violent tactics but also because of their association with Iran; they believed that these 
members were being utilized by a foreign body to undermine the success of Iraq’s new 
administration.243 In addition to violent tactics and accusations of ties to foreign nations, the Badr 
Brigade reveals the infiltration of government resources by violent militias: this organized crime 
soon became a staple of occupied Iraq.244 The group’s ability to access resources such as 
government uniforms reveals that corruption was already established in the new Iraqi 
administration shortly after its formation, and that sectarian ideologies that fueled the violence 
that had permeated the many layers of Iraqi society.245 
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 Unlike the Badr Brigade, which had existed before the American occupation but certainly 
became more active afterwards, the Mahdi Army was an entirely new phenomenon in Iraq that 
arose after the invasion in 2003. This militia formed out of volunteers, mostly Shia residents of 
the working class neighborhood in Baghdad known as Sadr City, in which Ayatollah Muqtada 
al-Sadr had his support base and sphere of influence. Al-Sadr emphatically denounced the 
presence of US troops on Iraqi soil and called on these volunteers to form a militia and fight 
against the occupation. The majority of the Mahdi Army members were not recruited through 
any sort of formal process until the organization became more bureaucratized several years into 
its operation. Despite evidence to the contrary, al-Sadr denounced the idea of partition based on 
different ethnic and religious identities in Iraq. He denied any part in sectarian violence and 
instead accused the U.S. forces of deliberately inciting violence among these religious 
communities as part of a divide and rule policy.246 Like other militia groups, the Mahdi Army 
also depended on methods of organized crime as the primary source of its income, including 
robbery of petroleum, cars and houses during ethnic cleansing campaigns.247 
Several Iraqi citizens have come forward and shared their experiences with the Mahdi 
Army with reporters. Some of these men and women had supported the movement, either by 
taking up arms or by offering accommodations to volunteers. Others have witnessed, or had been 
subjected to, acts of sectarian violence at the hands of the Mahdi Army. For example, Ahmed 
Abu Ali, a deeply religious man living as a shopkeeper in Baghdad, had never been involved in 
the army or politics prior to the U.S. invasion. At first, he supported the U.S. presence because 
he had suffered under Saddam Hussein’s regime for avoiding military service, and believed that 
the dictator’s overthrow would allow for the country to rebuild itself, free from such an 
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oppressive force. Upon seeing Coalition forces overthrow the dictator, he expressed “Look, I am 
a Shi’ite. I know Saddam and his butchers. I had felt that tyranny and oppression touching me 
every day of my life, and at that moment I could feel it all just melting away”.248 However, he 
also mistrusted U.S. motives in Iraq due to their refusal to help the Iraqi population overthrow 
Hussein during its last intervention in the country, the Gulf War. While George Bush had 
encouraged Iraqis in Basra to overthrow Saddam, U.S. forces offered no aid when they attempted 
to do so, and they were crushed by the regime’s retaliation as a result.249  He came to see the 
presence of U.S. troops as harmful to Iraq, and he decided to join the Mahdi Army to fight 
against the occupation.250 In this case, Ahmed expressed no tensions or hatred towards Iraq’s 
Sunni population. Thus, Ahmed’s view towards the United States shows that U.S. military forces 
had already damaged their reputation among Iraqi citizens well before the invasion in 2003. 
Since they had failed to help the population to overthrow an oppressive dictator and rebuild a 
safe and stable Iraq in 1991, he saw no reason to believe that they would do so in 2003. 
Despite the dangers associated with going against the Mahdi Army, some Iraqis did so in 
order to defend their fellow Iraqis from violent attacks based solely on their sectarian identity. 
Rachim Hassan Haikel, who had worked under Saddam Hussein distributing commodities such 
as flour, sugar and tea to Iraqi families during international sanctions, constantly struggled with 
militias such as the Mahdi Army in order to deliver supplies to families in need regardless of 
their religious affiliation.251 In order to offer aid to Shia families being persecuted by Sunni 
insurgents, the Mahdi Army often robbed government officials like Rachim in order to steal 
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rations designated for Sunni families.252 Despite these dangers, he continued to deliver supplies 
to Sunni families. While living in neighborhoods controlled by the Mahdi Army forces, he noted 
that these militiamen often used abandoned houses of Sunni families as torture centers.253 He 
said about these affected neighborhoods affected by the militia’s presence: “They were losers. 
They were thugs. They were ruining our neighborhood. It used to be a good place, a place where 
people of both sects wanted to live. Now it had a reputation as a militia haven.”254 The activities 
of the Mahdi Army and other militia groups disrupted all levels of Iraqi society by introducing 
sectarian violence to the residential areas of Iraq. This led to communal violence in which 
civilians turned against other civilians because the political leaders were fighting one another for 
control over the state. 
 The Coalition, in an effort to stabilize Iraq amidst the chaos caused by the violence from 
various militia groups, employed a strategy of divide and rule when dealing with the Badr 
Brigade and the Mahdi Army. While both groups utilized violence to establish control and 
legitimacy, the Badr Brigade enjoyed more legitimacy than the Mahdi Army through its political 
arm, the SCIRI. The Coalition leaders were aware of the SCIRI’s alleged affiliation with Iran 
and sectarian political goals.255 However, the establishment of the SCIRI as a legitimate political 
party and its success in national elections cemented the organization’s presence as a prominent 
political force. In an effort to downplay its previous involvement with violence and foreign 
governments, the group dropped the “Revolution” from its name and became the Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq in 2007. In addition, it also shifted its public allegiance from Iranian 
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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to Iraqi Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.256 In response to these political moves 
and cooperation with U.S. forces, the Coalition supported the ISCI over the Mahdi Army, which 
lacked a legitimate political branch. However, the decision to favor one Shia militia over another 
furthered sectarian conflict within the country, both in terms of divisions within Shia political 
organizations and with other groups with sectarian ideologies. While the ISCI certainly made 
efforts to eliminate its more violent branches such as the Badr Brigade and establish itself as a 
legitimate political party, its Shia bias has been well established and favors government 
partisanship that may further sectarian violence.257 
 
Causes, Dimensions, and Consequences of the Sunni Insurgency 
 
 Shia militiamen were not the only ones to exploit existing sectarian tensions to promote 
their own vision of Iraq’s future: Sunni militia groups used similar violent tactics to achieve 
their goals. The Sunni insurgency that arose after the invasion in 2003 was not a monolithic 
phenomenon, but rather a diverse amalgam of militias that, due to a variety of ideologies, all 
fought against the occupation.258 Sunni insurgents included ex-Ba’athists who had been 
excluded from the new government due to the de-Ba’athification policy, domestic and foreign 
members of Al-Qaeda, nationalist Salafists, and transnational Salafists.259260 This insurgent 
movement had two main origins, although motives were varied among the different 
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organizations. On a  pragmatic level, these insurgents were deeply angered at the violence 
caused by the American occupation in addition to their country being occupied by what they 
viewed as an imperialistic foreign power. Other groups, such as Al-Qaeda, derived their 
motivation from their interpretation of a particular religious ideology. According to these 
insurgents, the occupation of Iraq was only one site of a global attack on Islam and occupation 
of Muslim lands by Israel, the United States, and other Western powers.261 In general, many 
Sunnis felt alienated by the new government during this time period because many U.S. 
Coalition officials unfairly associated them with Hussein’s regime, while they viewed Shia and 
Kurdish citizens as more reliable.262 
 In addition to former Ba’ath Party members, a separate group of Sunni insurgents 
included al-Qaeda members who had begun to operate in Iraq after the American invasion and 
subsequent occupation. Al-Qaeda’s presence and operations in Iraq aimed not only at resisting 
the occupation, but also at killing as many American and Iraqi Shia citizens as possible.263 Al-
Qaeda’s main sources of income in Iraq included ransom for both Iraqi and foreign kidnapped 
individuals, which put Iraqi civilians, especially those who were already targeted by the 
organization such as the Shia, in a particularly dangerous position.264The targeting of Shia 
citizens was due to the view held by Al-Qaeda members that the Shia are not Muslims but rather 
apostates of Islam and, along with the United States and other Western powers, a threat to the 
worldwide Islamic community . Al-Qaeda also used anti-Shia hate narratives to incite other Iraqi 
citizens who believed that the U.S. had blindly supported Shia citizens and marginalized others, 
to fight against the U.S. occupation. Al-Qaeda’s presence in Iraq also highlights an important  
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factor contributing to the sectarian violence in Iraq: the influence of foreign militants. The U.S. 
Military’s Center for Combating Terrorism discovered that up to 75% of suicide bombers in Iraq 
between August 2006 and 2007 were foreigners.265 The head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Zarqawi, 
was a Jordanian citizen and relied on troops that were also not originally from Iraq: 60% of these 
foreign fighters were from Saudi Arabia and Libya.266 Reporters for foreign news sources such 
as the New York Times described these young recruits for Al-Qaeda as “young, angry men, 
motivated by the anti-British, anti-American rhetoric that fills their ears every day.”267 This 
jihadi movement, due to its association with foreign influence, was also less popular among Iraqi 
citizens who wanted to rebuild Iraq as part of a national project.268 Even within the bounds of the 
Sunni insurgency as a whole, the lack of grassroots leaders, Al-Qaeda’s rigid stance on Islam, 
and the use of extreme violence were largely unpopular and viewed as a source of tension with 
other insurgent groups.269 In particular, many of these groups took issue with Al-Qaeda’s tactics 
of targeting places of worship and kidnapping civilians and viewed these practices as 
unacceptable.270  
 Many Iraqi citizens witnessed Sunni insurgent groups such as Al-Qaeda transform their 
formerly peaceful neighborhoods into centers of violent actions and ideologies. Ahmed Ibrahim 
Abdul Wahab, an engineering student and resident of Ameriya, was disturbed not only by the 
excessive violence used against civilians in his neighborhood, but also by Al-Qaeda’s efforts to 
undermine peaceful relations between religious and ethnic groups within this region and to 
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spread their own ideologies such as hatred towards Shia citizens.271 He observed, “One of the 
mosques in the area known for its sectarian leanings became a gathering point for those of the 
Al-Qaeda mindset. That was when this new ideology began emerging in the neighborhood. 
People started saying that Shi’ites were infidels”.272Labeling Shia Iraqi civilians as infidels had 
been a government practice under Saddam Hussein, but had not permeated the mindset of Iraqi 
society until the political violence and insurgent activities of after 2003. Ahmed also reported Al-
Qaeda members writing slogans such as “jihad” and “fight the occupier” on the walls of 
residential areas and attacking any local citizens who offered help to Shia families that were 
subjected to violent acts of prejudice on a daily basis. 273 
Omar Yousef Hussein, a Sunni from Baghdad, shared in an interview his  motives for 
joining the Sunni insurgency and his views on inter-communal relations in post-2003 Iraq. 
Unlike the ex-Ba’athists who joined the insurgency, Omar had no association with the previous 
regime. In fact, he had suffered under the previous regime’s repression and spent eight years in 
prison during this time period for political dissidence.274 Despite having been alienated by the 
previous regime, Omar felt angered by the American occupation, believing the United States 
had no right to invade and occupy the country, and therefore joined a  group of fellow Sunnis to 
fight against American troops. Having spent much of his youth in prison and then having seen 
his country being divided by foreign powers, he described feeling a sense of empowerment by 
joining the insurgency and fighting back against these powers by manufacturing roadside 
bombs.275 
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 Despite the fact that his entire group of insurgents consisted of Sunnis, Omar insisted 
that prejudice towards Shia Iraqis was never a factor in his group’s composition.  He 
explained: 
A lot of us, myself included, were very conservative religiously. But that was not the 
point. We did not want to waste time on arguments over religion. Doing so would have 
been a distraction. That’s why we excluded the Shi’ites. We knew there would be 
conflicts about that. Our base of support then was basically conservative rural Sunnis 
who in general took a dim view of Shi’ites. If we were working closely with Shi’ites, 
we might have lost some support in Sunni areas like where we held the meeting. So we 
just decided to avoid this whole problem mostly for organization purposes, not 
sectarian or ideological reasons.276 
 
 Omar’s commentary reveals a great deal regarding sectarian relations in Iraq during the 
insurgency. For example, his insistence that religious difference was not a motivating factor in 
excluding Shia citizens from joining his insurgent group suggests that he was reluctant to be 
honest with the interviewer regarding his views towards this community. His failure to 
acknowledge  the prejudices of his main base of support reveals a state of denial regarding the 
rising tensions among these communities throughout the country. The fragmentation, even 
among insurgent groups, is particularly troubling given the history of interactions between Sunni 
and Shia citizens during times of foreign occupation in Iraq. During the Mandate period, many 
Iraqis had put aside any existing social tensions in the presence of a common enemy, in this case 
the British, in order to drive out the foreign invader. However, Omar’s testimony reveals a 
sharpening of these tensions to the point where they divide Iraqi society even during a deeply 
unpopular foreign occupation. Groups such as Al-Qaeda contributed to the fragmentation of Iraqi 
society, largely by foreign influence and militants.277 Despite his desire to deny his own anti-Shia 
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sentiments, the actions of his militia reveal the politicization of religious and ethnic communities 
through the use of violence. 
 
Kurdish Militias and the Struggle for Kurdish Autonomy 
 
A third area of militia activity, although not as widespread as the Sunni insurgency or 
Shia militias, was the group of Kurdish political factions known as the Peshmerga. The 
Peshmerga was an amalgamation of previously existing militarized Kurdish groups, including 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) founded in 1975, and the Kurdish Democratic Party 
(KDP) founded in 1946.278 While these parties represented different sub-groups, they largely 
coexisted peacefully and formed an alliance during the American occupation in order to pursue 
the shared goal of greater Kurdish autonomy. The majority of Kurdish citizens did not become 
involved in ethnic or religious violence: due to their marginalized status under Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, many Kurds were willing to work with the Coalition in order to achieve greater 
autonomy.279 However, Iraqis who joined the Peshmerga tried to achieve this goal for the 
Kurdish region of Iraq through tactics that were violent or prejudiced towards Iraq’s Arab 
population. For example, Peshmerga forces tried to reverse Saddam Hussein’s policy of moving 
Arab families into Mosul as part of his Arabization campaign. As part of this policy, Kurdish 
civilians had been forcefully uprooted from their homes and forced to flee the region. In 
attempting to reverse the effects of this campaign, Peshmerga forces terrorized Arab citizens in 
the region and tried to intimidate them into leaving. Rahma Abdul Kareem Abbas, who moved 
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with her family from Baghdad to escape the violence and stayed with family friends in Mosul, 
observed the effects of these tactics as follows:  
The Peshmerga, the Kurdish fighters were in that area, and they were trying to stop 
Arab families from settling there. They would search houses and go through the streets 
whooping war cries, like Indians of the Wild West or something. We were lucky, 
because we were staying with a Kurdish family. They kept us inside and did not let 
anyone search the house.280  
 
 While visitors to the region such as Rahma were certainly exposed to the violent tactics 
of the Peshmerga, Arab citizens who had lived in the region for decades suddenly became the 
primary target of the group. Hayder Hamad Jawad moved from Baghdad to Kirkuk during the 
Arabization campaign while he was working as a police officer. He lost his job in 1994 because a 
family member criticized Saddam Hussein, but he remained in Kirkuk and had been a resident of 
the region with his family from this point forward. After the U.S. invasion and the overthrow of 
Hussein’s regime, Hayder tried to become a police officer once again, but was frustrated by the 
prejudice towards Arab Iraqis that had emerged in Kirkuk due to the Peshmerga’s activities. He 
observed, “I went right away and tried to get my job back, but it was like some kind of joke. 
They weren’t hiring Arabs in Kirkuk, only Kurds. The city was slowly being taken over by 
Kurds.”281 In order to further isolate Arab residents, signs all over the city were switched from 
Arabic to Kurdish. Unprovoked acts of violence towards Arab citizens also increased. In 
response to these changes, Hayder noted, “It was all very strange to me, actually, this change. I 
had never known Kirkuk to be a violent place. For me it had always been a peaceful, dignified 
city where Arabs, Kurds and Turkomen all mingled together.”282 
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The Coalition was not solely responsible for the rise in insurgency in Iraqi in terms of 
condoning or supporting the actions of these organizations. However, their failure to control the 
influx of militants from neighboring countries such as Iran and Syria, along with the corruption 
in the new government allowing Shia militias to hijack branches of the administration caused 
sectarian violence to permeate every level of Iraqi society. The failure to control the chaos and 
looting at the onset of the 2003 invasion also caused the masses to lose faith in the Coalition’s 
ability to stabilize Iraq, thereby unintentionally giving legitimacy to militias that rose up to 
control the country through violence.283 In addition to domestic political conflict, Iraq was also 
influenced by extremist violent ideologies, like those of Al-Qaeda, which were initially due to  
foreign influence. Many Iraqis who participated in interviews observed the violent tactics used 
by these militia groups and insisted that they had never felt nor witnessed such tensions among 
citizens until organized violence and extremist ideologies hardened the dividing lines. Polling 
results collected by the International Republican Institute in March 2006 confirmed the attitudes 
reflected in these interviews: over 90% of the Iraqi population believed that, despite maintaining 
security in regions where the government had lost control, the militias had had a debilitating 
impact on the unity of the nation and should be completely disbanded. In addition, 65% of Iraqis 
felt that militias made Iraq a more dangerous, not more secure, place to live.284 Allowing 
members of Al-Qaeda to cross the borders into Iraq enabled the group to mount a strong 
insurgency, interfering with the new Iraqi administration and damaging the daily lives of Iraqi 
citizens by sowing fear and communal violence.285  
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The Culmination of Sectarian Violence in Iraq- Fallujah and “The Surge” 
 
The anger over the election results and dissatisfaction over a voting system built on 
sectarian identity caused widespread violence throughout Iraq. At the state level, specific 
branches of government were infiltrated by militias who took advantage of state resources to 
engage in large-scale violence against civilians based on their group identity. A prime example 
of the hijacking of government resources for sectarian violence was seen in the Bunker Prison 
episode in 2005, in which Shia militants infiltrated the Ministry of the Interior to torture and 
starve Sunni citizens in state prisons.286 Thus, while the ruling administration did not sanction 
these episodes of violence, its inability protect its own branches of government from corruption 
perpetuated the use of violence against civilians through state resources. In the wider Iraqi 
community, diverse neighborhoods that had peacefully coexisted became centers of sectarian 
violence through the exploitation of violence and dangerous ideologies propagated by militias 
such as Al-Qaeda and the Mahdi Army. The frequency and intensity of these episodes 
culminated in Fallujah, a once peaceful suburb of Baghdad, 
where the severity of social fragmentation across ethnic and sectarian lines manifested itself in 
violence. 
 In addition to its failure to control lawlessness shortly after the invasion, to prevent 
insurgents from crossing the border into Iraqi, and to stabilize the country as communal 
violence increased, the Coalition’s excessive use of violence in civilian areas further 
contributed to the rise in sectarian tensions and the overall social fragmentation of the country. 
Like several formerly peaceful neighborhoods in Baghdad, Fallujah had no past history of 
ethnic or religious violence until the development of Iraqi militia groups in Iraq after the 2003 
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invasion. After this date, however, Sunni insurgents had transformed this area into a center for 
manufacturing weapons and training its members.287 In 2004, violence broke out in Fallujah 
when insurgents killed four Blackwater troops, members of a private contracting group 
working for the U.S. army, as part of their organized resistance to the American occupation. 
U.S. forces demanded that the insurgents of Fallujah turn over those who were responsible for 
these attacks. When they refused, U.S. forces attacked the neighborhood and bombed a well-
known mosque in the area. The attack provoked outrage among Iraqi citizens who viewed U.S. 
actions as excessive use of violence in a residential area. While the specific number of Iraqi 
deaths during these attacks is difficult to assess, groups such as the U.N. Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that during just the first week of attacks on 
Fallujah, more than 700 Iraqi civilians were killed, 550 of whom were women and 
children.288Overall, the attacks on Fallujah for many Iraqis represented a complete outrage over 
the United States military’s excessive use of violence against civilians, and any popular support 
among Sunni communities for U.S. presence in Iraq had been lost.289 From the U.S. 
perspective, this event signaled a need for a change in strategy in its treatment of civilians in 
order to garner more support, in this particular case from Sunni Iraqis. 
The attacks on Fallujah aggravated existing tensions and episodes of sectarian violence 
in the community since the 2003 invasion and served as a catalyst for what became known as 
“The Surge”. During the Surge, the U.S. military attempted to alter its policies towards 
civilians based on the massive outraged provoked in Fallujah, and attempted to win the hearts 
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and minds of Sunni Iraqis. The catalyst for the violence leading up to the Surge was bombing 
of the Shia al-Askari mosque in Samarra on February 22nd, 2006 by Sunni insurgents. In 
addition to killing innocent civilians, this attack also served as an assault on Shia identity in 
general by destroying one of its most prominent landmarks in the country. Thus, attacks such as 
the bombing of the al-Askari mosque only served to further perpetuate sectarian violence by 
inciting outrage among civilians who became threatened by those insulting an aspect  of their 
communal and individual identity. Shia Iraqis, threatened by this assault on this dimension of 
their identity, retaliated by attacking and burning a predominantly Sunni neighborhood near 
Latifiya allegedly harboring citizens who participated in bombings in Najaf and Karbala. These 
tit-for-tat episodes of violence continued from 2006-2007. As the violence increased, so did the 
derogatory discourse towards each community. While all Sunnis were referred to as Al-Qaeda 
extremists, Shia Iraqis were seen as Iranians.290 This increase of stereotyping reflects a 
troubling shift in societal attitudes capable of doing more long-term damage to the nation in 
terms of communal relations than any specific episode of violence. Previous administrations 
have utilized powerful hate narratives such as these in order to achieve political goals, but 
never before in Iraq’s modern history have such terms permeated the community and resulted 
in such inter communal tensions without encouragement from the state. 
“The Surge”, or the military movement designed to end the escalation of this sectarian 
warfare, was executed through the combined forces of American military personnel and 
volunteer Iraqi citizens trying to regain control over their community from violent militia 
groups in what became the Awakening Movement. During this movement, Sunni militias 
worked alongside U.S. forces to subdue the escalating violence in residential areas. In 
particular, Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha became the first tribal leader to throw his support behind 
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this joint military effort in January of 2007, and was able to convince several other prominent 
members of the community to do the same.291 This military campaign, composed of volunteers 
and mostly Sunni insurgents brought to a halt the ethnic and religious violence in Baghdad’s 
most unstable neighborhoods, such as al-Anbar.292 While American forces certainly contributed 
to the stabilization of these neighborhoods plagued by sectarian warfare, they could not have 
successfully weakened the resistance without the aid of those involved in the Awakening 
Movement.293 While the presence of U.S. troops and their efforts to curb violence in Iraq are 
temporary, the participation of concerned citizens such as those of the Awakening Movement 




The American invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq since 2003 ushered in the 
most tumultuous and complex era of ethnic and sectarian communal relations in the country's 
modern history. The causes of the rise in tensions, hate narratives and episodes of large-scale 
violence against civilians during this period are extremely varied and complex, making a 
successful plan for reconciliation a nearly impossible task. Unlike earlier periods in Iraq’s 
modern history in which political discourse and violence against certain ethnic and religious 
groups were propagated by the ruling regime, post-2003 Iraq witnessed the breakdown of inter-
societal relations and the culmination of ethnic and sectarian violence at both the state and 
community level. At the state level, the formation of political parties that actively mobilized 
and manipulated sectarian identities in addition to the infiltration of government ministries by 
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violent militias rendered the new administration incapable of successfully performing its 
everyday tasks and allowed for prejudices to take hold in official government offices. At the 
community level, the presence of violent militias with sectarian ideologies targeted ordinary 
citizens for violence and removed the possibility of peaceful coexistence among diverse 
religious and ethnic inhabitants. 
 While the United States is not solely responsible for this collapse of Iraqi society, its 
flawed policies concerning several key strategies in managing the occupation served as 
catalysts to propel Iraq into this state. Policies such as de-Ba’athification and the disbanding of 
the Iraqi army removed Iraq’s ability to stabilize the nation in the face of lawlessness and 
looting and alienated and nearly an entire class of citizens from participating in the new 
administration’s democratic process. The disenfranchisement of these individuals, in addition 
to the failure to control the influx of foreign insurgents, gave rise to powerful and violent 
militias such as the Badr Brigade, Al-Qaeda and the Mahdi army. These militias have 
contributed to the breakdown of Iraqi society by playing on existing tensions among ethnic and 
religious communities. Citizens facing discrimination and violent attacks, having lost faith in 
the ability of American forces to protect them, vested their trust in militias as their only source 
of protection.294 The culmination of these errors, combined with the militias’ unchecked violent 
ideologies and terrorist attacks against ordinary citizens, produced the failed state mired in full-
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 This thesis has traced the development of the construction of national and sub-national 
identities as a political tool in the Iraqi state,  the use of violence to reinforce identity, and the 
shift of the use of violence against civilians from the state to non-state civilian perpetrators. I 
have analyzed the concept of identity as it was understood in each specific historical period. For 
example, I examined ethnic, religious, and national identity, and asked how governments and 
other political and military leaders have shaped the concept of identity to suit personal or 
collective political interests, particularly during periods of foreign interference or direct 
intervention or war. Questions addressed throughout this research included, How have different 
government administrations throughout Iraq’s history manipulated the concept of identity for 
their political goals?. When did violence become a primary tool for enforcing these reconstructed 
identities?, and, How and why did leaders of militias recruiting civilians begin using this strategy 
to incite communal violence in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion?. I took these questions into 
consideration both when researching and analyzing specific historical periods of modern Iraq, 
and more globally in order to highlight overarching trends in the practice of violence to enforce 
identity as it is prevalent in current politics. 
Throughout the history of modern Iraq, ruling regimes have intentionally reshaped the 
concept of identity, and have used these imagined identities to marginalize entire communities to 
further their own political agendas. Throughout the British Mandate era and Saddam Hussein’s 
reign, the concept of identity was used  as tool of the state and as a means of social and political 
control. As we have observed in Chapter One, British policy makers in charge of assembling a 
new Iraqi government built on existing practices of Sunni dominance and Shia marginalization 
under the Ottoman Empire by legalizing this system of identity-based discrimination. Under 
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Saddam Hussein, the Ba’ath Party criticized the policies of British colonialists and emphasized 
equality among all citizens. However, this lofty rhetoric  directly contrasted with Hussein’s 
actual treatment of Iraqi citizens, and he enforced his interpretation of Iraqi identity through 
state-sponsored violence. Finally, throughout the US invasion of subsequent occupation of Iraq, 
the concept of identity was again used for political manipulation, and violence was used as the 
primary tool of hardening these identities. However, this period was unique in the context of 
Iraqi modern history because the perpetrators of large-scale violence against civilians were no 
longer officials of the state, but the leaders of sectarian militias.  
The long-standing practice by different and successive state powers in Iraq of 
reinterpreting and violently enforcing national identity, culminating in the collapse of the state in 
2003 and the U.S.-led Coalition’s failure to establish security and stability during the occupation, 
led to the presence of  militias that used of organized violence against civilians of differing 
ethnic and religious backgrounds. While the United States committed many blunders throughout 
this period, there was also Iraqi agency in the rise of sectarian violence, as seen in the corruption 
in government ministries and the violent actions of government officials and other political and 
religious leaders of sectarian-leaning militias. Consequently, this use of ethnic and religious 
violence against civilians resulted in the further fragmentation of Iraqi state and society. 
 
The British Mandate and the Origins of Differential Access to the State 
 
The British Mandate was an essential period in the history of modern Iraq to research in 
terms of understanding the origins of the state’s unequal treatment of citizens based on ethnic or 
religious status. Prominent historians have investigated the status of various ethnic and religious 
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communities, such as the Shia majority of Iraq, prior to the British occupation in order to more 
accurately realize the impact of this foreign intervention on Iraqi group identities and communal 
relations. In her research of the pre-modern provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul under the 
Ottoman Empire, historian  Hallah Fattah investigated the concepts of individual and communal 
identity among Sunni and Shia communities under the jurisdiction of Ottoman officials prior to 
World War I.  In Basra, for example, the concept of one’s individual identity was more fluid in 
comparison to that of contemporary Iraqi society, and was influenced by the region’s economic 
relationships with neighboring societies as well as with the ruling Ottoman administration. In 
1907, the presence of merchants from India and the Persian Gulf  caused Basra to become a 
prominent center of linguistic and cultural exchange.296 As a result, existing cultural elements 
indigenous to the province became fused with Arab and Indian influence, and a new identity took 
shape.297 
In addition to economic influences, local religious authorities in Basra also made an 
impact on communal identity prior to the British occupation of the region. In 1908, the province 
was in the midst of a movement of large-scale conversions to Shi’ism due to the policies of the 
leading local families and members of the 'ulama in Najaf. These families hoped to consolidate 
this religious identity in order to resist the encroaching troops of Wahabi tribes from the Arabian 
Peninsula.298 What is most striking about this example is the level of fluidity and adaptability 
pertaining to a religious identity. This is different, as I have argued in this thesis, from the 
contemporary period in which Sunni, Shia and Kurdish identities have become so politicized and 
rigid that they are a major factor in the fragmentation of Iraqi state and society. Prior to the rise 
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of the Iraqi nation-state however, specifically the British-led nation-state, these identities did not 
determine individuals’ multi-dimensional identities and appear not to have been reduced to the 
only or most significant identity of individuals or groups. 
In contrast to the substantial influence on culture and identity from foreign merchants and 
prominent local powers at the start of the 20th century, the state was quite inactive in promoting a 
specific identity as a political tool. Ottoman officials in Basra, while formally in charge of 
government affairs in the region as part of the Ottoman Empire, largely only held influence at the 
administrative level and enacted no policies to shape or enforce a government-sanctioned version 
of communal identity that would reflect their culture and political interests. As a result, only the 
landholding elite and merchant class spoke Turkish and assimilated to Ottoman culture, while the 
countryside remained primarily unaffected by Ottoman presence and the associated culture failed 
to permeate through the various layers of Basra society.299  
This lack of a deliberate policy on the part of the Ottoman state with regard to identity 
directly contrasts with government influence within this sphere under the British Mandate. 
During this period, British officials exploited the existing practice of promoting members of the 
Sunni landholding elite class into positions of political power and largely excluding the Shia 
majority, officially legalizing the practice of differential access to the state based on one’s ethnic 
or religious identity.300 In addition, choosing Faisal, a member of the Sunni aristocracy as the 
first king of Iraq, served to cement this preferential treatment of the ruling Sunni elite. The state, 
under the leadership of British officials such as Percy Cox, also engaged in anti-Shia rhetoric that 
marginalized the majority of the population and gave them limited access to the state. This 
government was  the first in Iraq’s modern history to construct a national identity, particularly 
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one that suited their political and colonial expansionist goals, and enforce it on Iraqi society as a 
whole. At this point in Iraqi history, however, violence was not yet introduced as a routinely 
used tool to reinforce these constructed identities. 
 
Saddam Hussein and the Use of Violence to Enforce National Identity 
 
The divisive policies contrived by the British-controlled administration during the 
Mandate Period had long-lasting affects on the interaction between the Iraqi state and its 
civilians. As the Ba’ath Party rose to power, prominent officials including Saddam Hussein 
supported lofty, romantic rhetoric stressing unity, socialism and nationalism. The Party was 
knowledgeable and deeply critical of these prejudiced policies that had become rooted in the 
Iraqi state during the British Mandate, calling for an abandonment of such policies and the 
establishment of an independent, unified state that practiced equality among all its citizens. 
However, the Party’s actions, particularly those under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, 
contradicted the official political discourse. Hussein departed from the Ba’ath Party’s official 
stance on unity and redefined the concept of Iraqi identity based on exclusionary principles and 
reinforced this new interpretation with violence. 
One of the first and most powerful alterations to the concept of Iraqi national identity was 
the equation of Ba’athi identity with national identity.301 By incorporating the ideologies of the 
ruling regime regarding national identity into official discourse , the Party legitimized its control 
over the government and criminalized those who rejected the Ba’ath Party not only as an enemy 
of the state, but of Iraq as a whole. One of the first groups of citizens to feel the repercussions of 
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these policies were the members (alleged or real) of rival political parties, which had been made 
illegal. Party officials demonized such individuals in the public sphere as enemies of the state as 
a means to legitimize kidnapping, arrest without charge, torture, and incarceration. In order to 
deter other citizens from questioning or rejecting the authority of the regime, Hussein also 
frequently used fear and violence as political tools. For example, alleged enemies of the Party 
were kidnapped from their homes in the middle of the night, moved to secret prisons, and would 
often be found dead in various locations with evidence of torture and disfigurement.302 
Hussein’s use of violence to enforce his interpretation of national identity, specifically 
one that maximized his power, was perhaps most obvious in the context of his treatment of 
Kurdish Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq War. During this eight-year war that was devastating to both 
countries in terms of loss of capital and human lives, Hussein relied heavily on nationalist 
discourse to portray the Iranians as enemies, or an “other” group, and rally Iraqi support for the 
war. In his speeches, for example, he referred to all Iraqis as Arabs and Iranians as Persian in 
order emphasize an ethnic distinction between the two nations and by association, a more subtle 
religious distinction between the largely Sunni ruling class in Iraq and Khomeini’s Shia 
theocratic state.303 This discourse had negative consequence for two communities in Iraq; 
Kurdish and Shia citizens. Although Hussein had stressed that the Kurds could be considered 
Arab under the banner of Iraqi unity in his previous speeches, their inability to conform to the 
new narrow and rigid standards of Iraqi identity by belonging to a separate ethnic group made 
them a primary target for the regime. In 1988, during the most violent episodes of the Iran-Iraq 
war, Hussein committed acts of genocide against the Kurdish community and justified his 
actions through the veneer of national defense. During the Anfal Campaign, the regime 
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destroyed entire Kurdish villages, relegated citizens to concentration camps, and subjected men, 
women and children to chemical attacks. Rather than hiding these actions from the public, 
Ba’athi officials such as Ali al-Majid demonized the Kurds as foreign enemies of Iraq and 
collaborators with Iran in order to justify their actions.304 
Just as the Kurds were targeted because of their ethnic identity, Shia citizens were 
subjected to large-scale acts of violence because the regime constructed them as unable to 
embody the increasingly rigid concept of Iraqi nationalism and national identity. Following the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, residents of Basra, affected by the violence and chaos caused 
by the invasion and encouraged by the United States, rose up against the regime and attempted to 
overthrow Hussein. The dictator’s retaliation reflected a strategically engineered political 
discourse designed to delegitimize their grievances and portray them as traitors and sympathizers 
of Iran.305 The term for these uprisings in official discourse, the “Shia uprisings”, is in itself a 
hate narrative because it reduces these demonstrations against a repressive regime as an 
unjustified act armed rebellion by a select group of citizens. In addition, labeling the uprisings as 
pertaining to a specific religious group also insinuates that religious ideology was the principle 
motivation for the actions of these Iraqis. In this situation, excessive violence and political 
marginalization, rather than religious identity, were the main reasons behind the uprisings. 
Overall, the main development during this period towards ethnic and religious violence among 
civilians was the addition of state-sponsored violence towards civilians as a tool for reinforcing a 
particular concept of Iraqi identity that tried to divide and rule different groups of Iraqis and 
bolster the power of the regime. 
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The U.S. Occupation and its Contribution to Sectarian Violence 
 
The U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq completely altered the country’s 
political landscape and infrastructure in addition to having far-reaching adverse effects on social 
fragmentation and the rise of communal violence. Prior to this invasion, Iraq had suffered for 
over a decade under harsh UN sanctions, bringing the economy to the verge of collapse while the 
population still suffered under a despotic ruler.306 In a poorly planned effort to overthrow 
Hussein’s regime, the U.S.-led Coalition left Iraq with a power vacuum and an increase in 
organized crime from violent militias due to the complete lack of security forces to restore law 
and order. During this period of instability, political factions emerged around opportunistic 
leaders who mobilized the identity-groups to which they belonged to gain power for themselves. 
These leaders were often encouraged, or even repatriated by the United States. After establishing 
power, these leaders organized militias that committed large-scale violence against civilians, 
making Iraqi civilians the perpetrators as well as the victims of sectarian violence. 
In addition to leaving the country in this precarious state, the U.S. continued to make 
enormous strategic and military blunders that only increased the power of militias such as the 
Mahdi Army and al-Qaeda and resulted in full-scale sectarian violence throughout Iraq. 
Although ethnic and religious tensions among Iraq’s diverse communities certainly existed prior 
to this period, as we have seen in Chapter One and Chapter Two, the domination of such militias 
across the country and the civilian participation in large-scale acts of violence against citizens of 
a different ethnic or religious background is seen nowhere else in the history of modern Iraq. 
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Therefore, while the actions of the United States in Iraq were not the only contributing factor to 
the rise of sectarian violence in Iraq, they nevertheless served as the main catalyst for the 
fragmentation of Iraqi state and society along sectarian lines.  
The U.S.-led Coalition committed several key errors that contributed to the rise of 
sectarian militias and the subsequent escalation of sectarian violence among Iraqi civilians. The 
first major misstep was the failure to gain the Iraqi population’s support and confidence that their 
forces could successfully maintain stability throughout the occupation. Iraqi society’s lack of 
trust and confidence towards U.S. forces began in the Gulf War when civilians were encouraged 
to overthrow Hussein during the uprisings in Basra, but then received no aid from the U.S. 
military and were completely devastated by the intense violence that ensued from the dictator’s 
retaliation.307 In 2003, the U.S. failed once again to gain the population’s trust by its inability to 
control the looting, violence and lawlessness that ensued following the toppling of the Ba’ath 
Party’s regime.308 In addition, strategic miscalculations such as de-Ba’athification and the 
dissolution of the Iraqi army alienated an entire educated class of Iraqis with in-depth knowledge 
of government functions from participating in the new administration, many of whom were left 
with few options for earning a livelihood than to join one of the emerging militias. These 
militias, in turn, gained support from many Iraqi civilians even if they did not subscribe to their 
violent tactics because they provided security and relative stability in some neighborhoods were 
US forces not been able to do so. The leaders of these militias, as well as corrupt politicians 
working within the new administration, reveal Iraqi agency in politicizing sectarian identities 
through the use of violence.  Thus, while the United States forces created a power vacuum by 
                                               
307
 Heinze, Eric. "Humanitarian Intervention and the War in Iraq: Norms, Discourse and State Practice." Parameters (2006): 20-
31. 
308
 Kukis, p. 21 
Bellini 114
removing Saddam Hussein, several Iraqi political and military leaders acted as opportunists and 
exploited this political instability to their own advantage. 
 
Analysis: The Development of Sectarian Violence and Suggestions for the Future of Communal 
Relations in Iraq 
 
The use of violence among civilian groups of varying ethnic and religious backgrounds 
developed in three main phases throughout the history of modern Iraq. Under the British 
Mandate, British officers and King Faisal I introduced a system of differential access to the state 
by favoring Sunni Iraqis in government practice as well as in the Constitution over their non-
Sunni counterparts. This Sunni favoritism and subsequent marginalization of other communities, 
such as the Shia majority, became encapsulated into part of Iraq’s national identity and was 
continually supported by the state. Under Saddam Hussein, the Ba’ath Party, despite lofty 
rhetoric of equality for all Iraqi citizens, perpetuated the trend of Sunni dominance to suit its 
political goals and introduced large-scale violence against civilians to reinforce its reinterpreted 
concept of identity as one of its main political tools. Finally, during the U.S. occupation 
beginning in 2003, the breakdown of the state and the actions of violent militia groups marked 
the transition of the use of large-scale violence to divide and rule identity groups from state to 
non-state civilian hands and seriously harmed communal relations throughout the country. State-
sponsored favoritism under the Mandate, the large-scale violence used by Saddam Hussein, and 
the outbreak of sectarian violence due to the failures of the US Occupation were all essential in 
producing the state of severe fragmentation of Iraqi state and society that exists today. 
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The breakdown of inter-societal relations and the intensification of acts of violence 
against civilians based on ethnic and religious identity in Iraq has been a development nearly one 
hundred years in the making; likewise, implementing successful and long-lasting solutions will 
likely require years of effort on both the state and community level. On the state level, the Iraqi 
administration faces the task of reevaluating quota systems and sectarian-leaning political parties 
that reduce the political process to one’s ethnic or religious background and encourage citizens to 
vote according to these identities for fear of being marginalized in the political sphere. The 
government must also address the infiltration of specific branches and ministries by militia 
groups and reestablish security in all of its divisions.309 In addition, both the state and community 
must make efforts towards reestablishing the population’s confidence in the ruling administration 
to successfully provide social welfare programs and maintain security over the country, 
including its international borders and local neighborhoods. After demobilizing the militias, the 
government must implement successful measures towards integrating ex-militia men into Iraq 
state and society.310 If these issues are addressed, the bulk of the militias’ power will be 
diminished, and Iraq may begin the process of improving relations among its  population and 
make amendments to the ruling administration to reflect principles of equality for all Iraqi 
citizens. These improvements will not alter popular mindsets and distrust immediately, but 
reform at the state level is essential to any other efforts at post-conflict social reconstruction and 
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